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INTRODUCTION

Human rights activists routinely presume that more is more: that
more treaties, more norms, more litigation, more laws, more expansive
judgments, etc., necessarily result in greater rights protection. This
Article questions that supposition in the context of economic, social, and
cultural rights in the Inter-American system. We argue that, given the
limited resources of this system, the potentially adverse consequences of
developing legal standards that may not be applied, and the potentialinherent in the development of novel jurisprudence -for undermining
states' respect for the system itself, less frequent and more focused
litigation may, in fact, be more valuable. In particular, we urge lawyers
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and activists in the Inter-American system to recognize the limited and
often subsidiary role of legal advocacy in promoting the recognition of
economic and social rights and distributive justice. In the end, we
conclude that successful promotion of economic, social, and cultural
rights in the Inter-American system should be incremental, firmly
grounded in established precedent, and always linked to vigorous social
movements and effective advocacy strategies.
This Article urges human rights practitioners, petitioners, lawyers,
and judges, particularly those at the international level, to think both
creatively and critically about strategies for developing the legal and
political architecture necessary for the effective enforcement of
economic, social, and cultural rights. In particular, we argue for a
pragmatic approach to developing this architecture within the InterAmerican system that focuses on the real-world impact that litigation of
individual cases is likely to have. We posit that those who seek
sustainable, structural, transformative changes of Latin American
society-and not merely sterile, judicial recognition of economic, social,
and cultural rights-are best served by adopting a restrained,
incremental, "less as more" approach to expanding these rights in the
Inter-American system.
A review of the degree of compliance with the determinations of the
Inter-American system, as well as our experience as activists in the
international arena, has convinced us that the impact of international
litigation is significantly enhanced when cases are accompanied by social
pressure on domestic authorities through a variety of other means. By
contrast, litigation strategies that are not linked to other forms of
pressure rarely achieve major impact and often are irrelevant in a way
that undermines the strength of supranational judicial bodies. In many
instances, the degree of impact is most closely linked not to the
importance of the Inter-American system's actions in a particular case,
but rather to the level of media and public interest in the matter and the
extent to which the government is pressured to respond (ordinarily, by
social movements and/or the media). Case studies across Latin America,
several of which we examine as part of our inquiry, illustrate this point.
Given the relatively solid theoretical and legal basis of human rights
in Latin America,' this Article focuses on approaches to increasing
protection for economic, social, and cultural rights in practice. In
particular, we consider the possibilities for expansion of these rights
through their recognition and enforcement by the two human rights
oversight bodies of the Organization of American States: the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission" or the
"Inter-American Commission") and the Inter-American Court of
i. See infra Part I, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas.

HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:217

Human Rights (the "Court" or the "Inter-American Court"). We begin
by analyzing the conditions necessary for the implementation of
economic, social, and cultural rights, then argue for an approach to
advocacy in the Inter-American system that most effectively utilizes this
intergovernmental mechanism to create these conditions.
To contextualize our analysis, we present a brief overview of the
history and operation of the Inter-American human rights enforcement
mechanisms, followed by an analysis of the extent to which-and the
conditions under which-decisions issued by these mechanisms achieve
real-world impact. We emphasize that while the implementation of
Commission recommendations and Court orders is one important way in
which these decisions can have practical effect, this is certainly not the
only means of achieving impact. We explore this point through case
studies that highlight a number of ways in which activists may use
international decisions as part of an integrated approach to domestic
advocacy.
We then examine the ways in which the supervisory bodies of the
Inter-American system have approached the enforcement of economic,
social, and cultural rights to date. As we will see, both the Commission
and the Court have confronted these issues in recent years. We argue
that to the extent the Court. and the Commission have been instrumental
in advancing human rights in the Americas, they have achieved this
through largely conventional interpretations of human rights norms that
have allowed both bodies to maintain the respect of governments and
activists.
Indeed, we urge activists to respect the dialectic nature of the
relationship between civil society and the governments and institutions
that make up the Inter-American system: civil society may seek
enforcement of individual rights through recourse to Inter-American
human rights protection mechanisms; yet the system depends on the
support of civil society for its legitimacy.' Governments provide the
required resources to keep the Inter-American system functioning and
elect the individuals who will serve as commissioners and judges on its
oversight bodies; but these institutions also depend on governments'
voluntary acceptance of their authority and good-faith participation in

2. In the months leading up to the June 2004 General Assembly of the Organization of
American States, for example, rights defenders throughout the Americas rallied to stave off efforts to
reduce the operating budget of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. A coalition of
some 93 entities argued that "Member States must rescind these [proposed] cuts and assume their
prior responsibilities and commitments to progressively and substantially increase the budgets of
human rights bodies." See Statement presented at the Thirty-Fourth Regular Session of the
Organization of American States General Assembly by International Coalition of Organizations for
Human Rights in the Americas, June 6-8, 2004, Quito, Ecuador, available at
http://www.cejil.org/asambleas.cfm?id=153 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
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the established rules of engagement in order to be effective. And the
institutions comprising the system have the authority to resolve claims
and to issue decisions requiring action on the part of both governments
and civil society actors; but this authority depends on the latter two
groups' perception that it is being exercised in a reasonable, appropriate
manner.
As actors in this complex web of interdependent institutions, legal
operators (i.e., lawyers, commissioners, and judges) seeking progressive
transformation of Latin American reality must be mindful of their
limited role in promoting economic, social, and cultural rights. It is vital
here that our argument not be misconstrued. We do not suggest that
human rights lawyers ought to accept gross inequality, nor that they limit
their activism to the areas in which the Inter-American system may be
used most effectively. Instead, we recommend that international human
rights lawyers accept the limits inherent in litigation in the InterAmerican system and seek alternative means of maximizing their impact
in advancing the agenda of social justice. We outline methods-including
defending the civil and political rights of leaders of social movements and
filing and winning cases involving a limited set of economic, social, and
cultural rights in conjunction with organized social movements -through
which international human rights advocates may maximize their impact.
Similarly, we urge the Court and the Commission, as institutions, not
to see themselves fundamentally as promoters of visionary jurisprudence
but to encourage respect for human rights by acting primarily as
adjudicatory and advisory bodies whose decisions and recommendations
enable those defending economic, social, and cultural rights on the
ground to promote concrete changes in state policy.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I considers economic,
social, and cultural rights in the Americas, examining the current socioeconomic and political context as well as the historic development of
these rights in the Inter-American system. That section analyzes the
limited nature of access to the Inter-American Commission and Court
and assesses the degree of compliance with the system's determinations.
Part II evaluates the potential of international litigation to effect realworld change. That section begins by examining critiques of rights-based
litigation as a means of achieving social justice in both the U.S. domestic
and international contexts. It then continues by reviewing case studies
from Brazil, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, seeking to draw conclusions
about the circumstances in which international litigation is most
effective. Part III analyzes international human rights jurisprudence,
both in the Inter-American system and beyond, drawing out the
conceptual differences between economic, social, and cultural rights and
their civil and political counterparts. It then focuses on three possible
bases for advancing legal protections for economic, social, and cultural
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rights. Finally, Part IV focuses on areas for future development, positing
both the legal arguments and the kinds of test cases we believe manifest
the greatest potential to establish precedents likely to be implemented by
states in the Americas.
I. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

In the past twenty years, as Latin America has emerged from a
period of intense struggle with civil wars, military dictatorships, and
massive, state-sponsored human rights abuse, the terms of the principal
human rights debates have undergone a dramatic shift. Civilian rule,
periodic elections, and a vast reduction in targeted civil and political
rights violations have marked the region for two decades. During the
worst years of repression and in the immediate aftermath of systematic
violations such as forced disappearances, extra-judicial executions, and
torture, the Latin American human rights movement understandably
focused on preserving the most basic civil and political rights-to life, to
physical integrity, and to due process. In a new era of democratically
elected governments, economic integration, and globalization, the
movement has now turned its attention to the enforcement of economic,
social, and cultural rights.3
At the same time, the transition to civilian rule has coincided with
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the global advance of free market
capitalism as the lone surviving economic model. This advance has
displaced socialism, undermining the capacity of leftist discourse and
projects to present alternatives to increasing inequality, widespread
poverty, unemployment, substandard housing and other chronic forms of
suffering. The combination of the shift to relatively stable civilian
governments, the maintenance and intensification of widespread poverty,
and the demise of the promise of leftist politics as a means of social
transformation has provoked significant change in human rights
discourse and practice as activists increasingly have embraced economic,
social, and cultural rights to respond to Latin America's chronic social
problems. With this shift has come a host of new challenges. Activists
and policymakers have grappled with legal and political structures-both
at the domestic and international levels -incapable of imposing
immediate obligations on states to protect and ensure economic, social,
and cultural rights.
A broad consensus has gradually emerged, affirming the need for

3. See, e.g., Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro, The Rule of Law and the Underprivilegedin Latin America:
Introduction, in (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (Juan E. M6ndez et
al. eds. 1999) (arguing that in transitional democratic states in Latin America, social class has
transcended political affiliation as the key factor in rights enjoyment and deprivation).
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increased "justiciability" of economic, social, and cultural rights. This
consensus has led to a proliferation of efforts by non-governmental
organizations, declarations by intergovernmental organizations, and
determinations by international adjudicatory and semi-judicial bodies
that seek to expand, often by mere affirmation, the scope of justiciability
of economic, social, and cultural rights.
The idea of economic, social, and cultural rights has been recognized
alongside civil and political rights since the establishment of basic human
rights principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.4 This
idea has been reiterated in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,5 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,6 and, in the Americas, in the Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (the "Protocol of San Salvador").7 While early
iterations of human rights underscored fundamental differences between
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social, and
cultural rights on the other, recent instruments and declarations have
sought to minimize these differences. 8 Indeed, official international
discourse has increasingly supported the idea that human rights are
interdependent and indivisible, and that economic, social, and cultural
protections are no less rights than their civil and political counterparts.
Nonetheless, the most fundamental economic, social, and cultural rights
of the four-fifths of humanity that live in dire poverty are disregarded on
a daily and massive basis.
Latin American nations-in discourse, at least-widely accept that
international legal norms on human rights exist and that they bind
states.9 In theory, economic, social, and cultural rights are no exception;
yet achieving the justiciability and exigibility of these rights has been
more difficult, largely due to the broadly criticized but still prevalent idea
that civil and political rights require mere non-interference by the state,
4. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/81o (1948).
5. InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,

21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 135, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976).
6. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. I6, at 49,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
7. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights "Protocolof San Salvador," Inter-Am. C.H.R. 67, OEA/ser. L./VIl.82,
doc. 6 rev.i (1992) (hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador).
8. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. World Conference on Human

Rights. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.15 7 /24 (1993) ("All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.").
9. A number of Latin American nations have stipulated the binding nature of international
human rights norms in their constitutions or in other sources of domestic law. See infra Part I.A.3.
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while economic, social, and cultural rights demand positive state action.
Scholars have criticized this distinction as overly simplistic, stressing the
mixed nature (omission and action) of all rights, and in so doing have set
out approaches that allow for the justiciability and exigibility of at least
some economic, social, and cultural rights.
A.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

I. HistoricalDevelopment
In May 1948, seven months before the United Nations General
Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the
Organization of American States ("OAS") approved the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the "American
Declaration")." That instrument set forth a series of fundamental human
rights-both civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural. In so
doing, the OAS juxtaposed alongside the "traditional" fundamental
rights to life, liberty, equality, and suffrage, the rights to education
(Article XII), culture (Article XIII), work (Article XIV), and even social
security (Article XVI).
But the Inter-American system lacked a binding treaty in the area of
human rights until 1969, when the OAS member states approved the
American Convention on Human Rights. While the American
Convention clearly constituted an advance in the defense of human
rights in the Americas, in that it provided treaty-level protection to
principles previously contained only in non-binding declarations, it also
represented a retreat from the broader vision of human rights
championed by the American Declaration. The Convention, unlike the
Declaration, failed to afford economic, social, and cultural rights the
same degree of specificity that had been established in the May 1948
Declaration. Indeed, the entire topic of economic, social, and cultural
rights in the American Convention is reduced to a single article, Article
26. That article, entitled "Progressive Development," establishes that:
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and
io. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4.
ii. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man ("The American Declaration"),
O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948),
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/ser.
L.V/II.82, doc. 6 rev. I, at 17 (1992).
12. American Convention on Human Rights ("Pact of San Josd, Costa Rica"), Nov. 22, 1969,
ii44 U.N.T.S. 123 (hereinafter Am. Cony. H.R.). Although the American Declaration established a
long list of rights, it is not a legally binding treaty, as we discuss below in footnote 3I and
accompanying text. For an overview of the governing human rights instruments of the OAS, including
a discussion of the way in which such instruments become binding, see TARA MELISH, PROTECTING
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM:
ON PRESENTING CLAIMS

3-23

(2002).

A

MANUAL
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through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and
technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation
or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in
the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set
forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 3

As we shall see, while this provision mentions economic, social, and
cultural rights explicitly, it has proven ineffectual as a basis for individual
claims. Indeed, Article 26 fails to establish any specific rights or concrete
duties. As we discuss in our review of recent cases, this principle has
been affirmed by the Court 4 and represents the dominant, though not
unanimous, view of Article 26 among governments, members, and staff
of the Inter-American Commission, and petitioning non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"). Expressing the dominant interpretation of the
practice of the Inter-American system prior to the recent entry into force
of the San Salvador Protocol, scholar and Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Justice Ant6nio Augusto Canqado Trindade has written,
"a gap in the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights has
remained in the international treaty system in the Americas because
Article 26 of the Convention limits itself to the 'progressive
development' of these rights."' 5
The Inter-American system's failure to provide protection for
economic, social, and cultural rights is contrasted by its active defense of
civil and political rights. In addition to its other functions,'6 the
13. Am. Conv. H.R., supra note 12, art. 26.
14. "Five Pensioners" v.Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (2003).
15. ANT6NIO AUGUSTO CAN ADO TRINDADE, TRATADO DE DIRErTo INTERNACIONAL DOS DIREITOS

HUMANOS 365-66 (Sergio Antonio Fabris ed. 1997). The original text of the citation reads, "[no
continente americano... persistiu... a lacuna no sistema interamericano de proteqao no tocante aos
direitos econ6micos, sociais e culturais, porquanto a Convenqo... se limitou a dispor (artigo 26)
sobre o 'desenvolvimento progressivo' destes iltimos."
16. Article 41 of the American Convention on Human Rights sets forth the Commission's
functions:
The main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense of human
rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and powers:
to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America;
to make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it considers such
action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within
the framework of their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate
measures to further the observance of those rights;
to prepare such studies or reports as itconsiders advisable in the performance of its duties;
to request the governments of the member states to supply it with information on the
measures adopted by them in matters of human rights;
to respond, through the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, to
inquiries made by the member states on matters related to human rights and, within the
limits of its possibilities, to provide those states with the advisory services they request;
to take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority under the
provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention; and
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Commission has, since its creation in 1959, reviewed, processed, and
reached conclusions regarding thousands of individual petitions alleging
violations of fundamental human rights. 7 The Court, through its advisory
opinions and, since 1986, through its work on contentious cases, has
adjudicated cases of rights abuse on a more limited scale, rendering
justice to individual victims and establishing important precedents.
A 1999 compilation on economic rights prepared by the InterAmerican Institute of Human Rights concludes:
To date, the effectiveness of the inter-American system in protecting
economic, social and cultural rights has been practically nil. This
assertion applies .. . [to countries] across the Americas, among other
reasons because human rights protection organs have focused, over the
past several decades, on the massive and systematic human rights
violations that occurred in the context of the military dictatorships that
nearly all Latin American countries suffered.'8
This gap in the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights
was filled-in part-by the Additional Protocol in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the "San Salvador
Protocol."' 9 The treaty, drafted over a period of years and completed in
1988, sets out a series of economic, social, and cultural rights. Among
them are the right to work (Article 6); the right to just and equitable
conditions of work (Article 7); labor rights (Article 8); the right to social
security (Article 9); the right to health (Article io); the right to a healthy
environment (Article II); the right to food (Article i2); the right to
education (Article 13); the right to the benefits of culture (Article 14);
the right to protection of families (Article 15); the rights of children
(Article 16); and the protection of the elderly (Article 17) and the
handicapped (Article 18).

to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American
States.
Am. Conv. H.R., supra note 12, art. 41, at 193.
17. Even prior to the adoption of the American Convention, which established the functions of
the Commission, this body received and processed complaints of human rights protected by the
American Declaration. OAS General Assembly Resolution No. XXII, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, and the 1967
Protocolo de Buenos Aires, OAS Treaty Series, No. i-A, conferred authority on the Commission to
process individual petitions much as it had been doing on a de facto basis shortly after its creation in
1959.
18. INTER-AMERICAN INsTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, LOS DERECHOS ECON6MIcos, SOCIALES Y
CULTURALES: UN DESAFfO IMPOSTERGABLE 19-20 (San Jos6, Costa Rica
(authors' translation). The

1999)

original Spanish text reads:
[H]asta el momento la real efectividad del sistema interamericano para proteger los
derechos econ6micos, sociales y culturales ha sido prdcticamente nula. Esta afirmaci6n es
aplicable ...[a los paises] del continente americano, entre otras razones debido a que la
atenci6n de los 6rganos de protecci6n durante las pasadas drcadas estuvo centrada en
masivas y sistemiticas violaciones a los derechos humanos, ocurridas en el marco de las
dictaduras militares sufridas por gran parte de los pafses latinoamericanos.
i9.Protocolof San Salvador,supra note 7.
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The San Salvador Protocol specifically provides for petition to the
Inter-American Commission to enforce the right to education, protected
in Article 13, and of certain labor rights, established in Article 8, clause
(a). Article i9, clause (6) states that:
Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph a) of Article
8 and in Article 13 are violated by action directly attributable to a state
party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to application of the system
of individual petitions governed by Article 44 through 51 and 6i
through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights."

The negative inference of the language used in Article i9 is that the
violation of other rights enshrined in the Protocol does not give rise to
the right of petition to the Inter-American system. Although petitioners
to the Commission have sought to defend the justiciability of all of the
rights protected in the Protocol, the Commission has construed Article
19 restrictively.'

Judicial and Quasi-JudicialOversight in the Inter-American
System
The OAS has created and developed a human rights system
composed of two oversight bodies: the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The
Commission, created in 1959, is a quasi-judicial body that promotes
human rights through a series of functions that go well beyond the
adjudication of individual cases. The Court, established by the American
Convention on Human Rights, is a purely legal body charged with
jurisdiction over individual disputes (contentious jurisdiction). The Court
also has the power to issue advisory opinions at the request of member
states of the OAS, the Commission, and other OAS bodies, and to issue
provisional measures for the urgent protection of individuals it deems to
be at imminent risk of violation of one or more protected rights."
Among the functions of the Commission is the receipt and
processing of individual petitions alleging violations of the rights
guaranteed in the Inter-American system. For those in the Americas
whose human rights have been violated, petition to the Commission is
often the most effective means of seeking a remedy at the international
level. In order to file a petition with the Commission, victims must first
exhaust domestic remedies. 3 This petition begins a process of litigation
before the Commission, which may lead to transfer of the case to the
2.

20. Protocol of San Salvador,supra note 7, art. 19.
21.

See Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez v. El Salvador, Case

12.249,

Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.

29/0 para. 35-36, OEA/ser. L./V./II. i I, doc. 20 rev. (20oo).
22. See Am. Conv. H.R., supra note 12, Ch. VIII.
23.

Petitioners may request exemption from this requirement in a limited set of circumstances.
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Inter-American Court. Before the Court, the Commission is transformed
from arbiter to party, becoming the petitioner against the state. Until
recently, the Commission was the primary representative of the original
petitioner's interests before the Court, but with the entry into force of
recent modifications in the Court's Rules of Procedure, victims may now
be represented by an individual or organization of their choice, who may
present independent evidence and arguments to the Court, alongside the
Commission.
a. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is composed of
seven members selected by the Organization of American States who
meet two or three times per year, for periods of two to three weeks.'
During these sessions, the members of the Commission review and
approve reports relating to cases that have been submitted by individuals
or NGOs alleging specific violations of rights enshrined in the American
Convention on Human Rights, the American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man, and various other Inter-American instruments. 5 In
addition, the Commission undertakes to resolve structural human rights
issues through a number of other activities, including observation and
reporting on general human rights conditions in member states, which
may include on-site visits and collaboration with local entities and
governmental agencies; the publication of reports on specific human
rights issues where it deems appropriate; and the organization of
conferences, seminars, and meetings with representatives of
governments, NGOs, academic institutions, and other groups."
In theory, petition to the Inter-American Commission is open to all
residents and rights groups in any member state of the OAS. But of the
24. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-

AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, tit. I, ch. V., art. 14, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
basicos/basici6.htm (updated Oct. 2003) ("The Commission shall hold at least two regular periods of
sessions per year for the duration previously determined by it and as many special sessions as it deems

necessary.").
25. The Commission is empowered to adjudicate cases against any of the OAS member states,
including those that have not ratified the American Convention. In the event the state charged has not
ratified the Convention, the Commission applies the human rights principles set forth in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, applicable to all member states by virtue of their
membership in the OAS. In addition to the aforementioned Protocol of San Salvador, applicable
human rights instruments include the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty; the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the InterAmerican Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons; the Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women ("Convention of Beldm do
ParV"); and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Persons with Disabilities. See Am. Cony. H.R., supra note 12.
26. As mentioned above, Article 41 of the Convention sets forth the Commission's functions. See
also Legal Bases and Activities of the IACHR During 2003, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. II,
OEAISer.LIV/II.i;8, doc. 5, rev. 2, available at http:llwww.cidh.org/annualrep/2oo3englchap.2.htm
(description of the Commission's legal bases, functions, and powers).
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hundreds of petitions the Commission receives each year, it decides
fewer than sixty matters, roughly half of which concern the admissibility
of the petition itself. These numbers demonstrate a critical characteristic
of the Inter-American system: it is one of limited access and one of even
more limited use in terms of obtaining binding, final decisions.
It is important to note that the Commission's role in shaping the
policies and practices of member states is through the issuance of
recommendations. Commission resolutions are not binding in the same
sense as determinations by the Court, although states do have a goodthe Commission's
implement
and
to
accept
faith
duty
recommendations. 7 Nonetheless, states can and often do reject these
recommendations, either explicitly or by failing to take measures to
ensure their implementation.
In sum, Commission reports are political instruments that may (or
may not) be effective as tools to pressure, persuade, or coerce states to
effect internal policy changes; but their compulsory effect on states is
limited, and, in isolation, tend to be only moderately effective in bringing
about meaningful change, as we will discuss in later sections.
b. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Created in 1978 on the entry into force of the American Convention,
the Inter-American Court focused almost exclusively on advisory
opinions until 1986, when the Commission submitted the first
contentious cases to the Court.8 From its inception through the end of
2004, the Court has published just i19 decisions in contentious matters
and nineteen advisory opinions. Of the decisions issued in contentious
matters, many refer to different procedural stages of the same case.
If the Commission is an organ of limited access, the Court is an
instance of extremely limited access. To begin with, the seven judges of
the Court29 generally convene for regular sessions three or four times a
year, for a total of approximately eight weeks. In comparison to the
Commission's staff of some two dozen attorneys, the Court depends on
only four senior and four junior attorneys to prepare draft reports and to
assist the Judges in their duties, thus limiting its productivity, at least in
numerical terms.
27. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has observed that, "the report or resolution of
the Commission does not have those binding effects. Its intervention is intended to enable it, on the
basis of good faith, to obtain the State's cooperation." Ad. Op. OC-s 5 , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
para. 28 (1997).
28. VelAsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. i
(1987); Fairdn-Garbi and Solfs-Corrales v. Honduras (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 2 (1987); Godinez-Cruz v. Honduras (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 3 (1987).
29. The selection of judges is guided by Articles 52-53 of the American Convention. Am. Conv.
H.R, supra note 12, arts. 52-53.
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Aggravating the structural barriers to widespread access is the
specialized nature of supranational litigation. Because petitioning the
Inter-American system requires knowledge of a particular body of
substantive and procedural law, very few advocates have made use of its
case resolution capacity, and those who have tend to be repeat players.
In Part II, we address critiques by critical legal studies scholars and
others who have argued that "queue jumping" through litigation
undermines efforts at distributive justice. To the extent that access to the
Inter-American system is concentrated in the hands of a small group of
practitioners, these concerns intensify.
Finally, the Court's authority to issue compulsory judgments is
contingent on the states' voluntary recognition of the Court's
jurisdiction, and not all member states have accepted jurisdiction. At this
writing, twenty-two states have recognized the Court's jurisdiction to
resolve contentious matters. 30 But while formal recognition of the Court's
jurisdiction is a necessary condition for the state to be bound by the
Court's orders, it is not necessarily a sufficient one for the practical and
effective implementation of such orders.
3. Implementation of Commission Recommendations and Court
Decisions
The international obligations that states assume upon joining the
Organization of American States and ratifying the American Convention
on Human Rights include the duty to respect the rights set forth in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and in the
American Convention. As a formal matter, the American Declaration is
not directly binding on states, as it does not have the status of a treaty
according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (I969). 3I
Both the Commission and the Court, however, have interpreted the
Declaration as indirectly binding on all member states by virtue of their
ratification of the OAS Charter, which is a legally binding treaty and

30. The states are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago has repudiated
its ratification of the Convention, however, effective May 26, 1998. Three additional countries,
Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica, have signed and ratified the American Convention but do not
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. The United States is a signatory to the Convention but has not
ratified it, nor has it recognized the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
31. The Inter-American Court has explicitly held that
"the Declaration is not a treaty as defined by the Vienna Conventions because it was not
approved as such....
... It was neither conceived nor drafted as a treaty.... [T]he Declaration was adopted as a
declaration, without provision for any procedure by which it might become a treaty .... "
Interpretation of the American Declarationof the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of
Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, OC-Io Ad. Op., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)

para. 33-34 (1989).
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which establishes state obligations regarding human rights with reference
to the American Declaration.3 2 The American Convention itself has the
status of a treaty and is therefore directly binding on all states that have
ratified it. The Convention has been ratified by the majority of the OAS
member states (notable exceptions being the United States, Canada, and
Cuba), including all Latin American nations, with the exception of Cuba.
According to the first two Articles of the Convention, states have a
duty to "respect" and "ensure the free and full exercise of"33 the rights
and freedoms enumerated in the Convention and to "undertake to adopt
... such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
to those rights or freedoms."34 The Commission has interpreted these
obligations as imposing a duty on states to comply with Commission
recommendations. In its 1997 Annual Report, the Commission explicitly
urged states to "comply with the recommendations made by the
Commission in its reports on individual cases and to abide by the
requests of provisional measures."35 The Commission wrote:
The Inter-American Court has indicated that States parties to the
American Convention have the obligation to adopt the
recommendations issued by the Commission in its reports on
individual cases, in the light of the principle of good faith. This
obligation extends to the member States in general, provided that,
pursuant to the OAS Charter, the Commission remains one of the
main organs of the Organization with the function of promoting the
observance and defense of human rights in the hemisphere.
Accordingly, the Commission urges the member States, whether they
are parties to the American Convention or not, to fulfill their

international obligations by following the recommendations issued in
the reports on individual cases and abiding by the requests of
provisional measures. 6
The Commission further invited member states "to adopt legal
mechanisms for the execution of the recommendations of the
Commission in the domestic sphere."37 To date, a handful of American

Id. para. 45.
For the member states of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines the
human rights referred to in the Charter. Moreover, Articles I(2)(b) and 20 of the
Commission's Statute define the competence of that body with respect to the human rights
enunciated in the Declaration, with the result that to this extent the American Declaration
is for these States a source of international obligations related to the Charter of the
Organization.
Id.; see also Roach & Pinkerton, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Resolution No. 3/87, paras. 44-49,
OEA/ser.L./V.JII.7i, doc. 9 rev. i (1987).
33. Am. Conv. H.R., supra note 12, art. i(i), at 166.
34- Id. art. 2.
35. Annual Report 1997, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. VII, para. 12, OEA/Ser.L/VIII.98, doc. 6 rev.
(1998).
36. Id.
37. Id. para. 13.
32.
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states have established special mechanisms or laws to facilitate the
implementation of Commission recommendations and/or Court
decisions. While it is important to emphasize that the creation of such
mechanisms does not necessarily ensure the effective application of
Inter-American decisions, such efforts represent an -important step
toward creating conditions in which such decisions can have practical
impact. Below, we cite several examples highlighted in a recent report by
the Center for Justice and International Law."'
- An agreement between Costa Rica and the Inter-American Court
establishes that resolutions issued by the Court or by its President,
upon transmission to domestic administrative and judicial authorities,
will have the same effect as sentences handed down by the domestic
judiciary.39
- Colombia's Law 288/96 establishes a mechanism to require the
Government to pay damages resulting from human rights violations
established by decisions of the Human Rights Committee of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and/or the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights. 40 An important aspect of
Law 288 is that it authorizes the application of the procedure even
where the applicable limitations period to obtain damages under
domestic law has expired. 4' As a result, the statutory limitations that
have been one of the primary factors resulting in impunity have been
rendered ineffective. Colombia's Government is actively using this
mechanism.

* Peru's habeas corpus and constitutional amparo law42 recognizes the
obligatory nature of decisions issued by the Inter-American oversight
bodies. 43 Article 40 of that law provides for implementation and
compliance with international resolutions and establishes that the
validity of international resolutions is not contingent on domestic
recognition or review.'" The Peruvian Supreme Court receives
resolutions issued by international bodies and orders their execution
according to applicable domestic norms and procedures.
* Article 15 of Honduras' 1982 Constitution states that "Honduras
makes its own the principles and practices of international law aimed
at human solidarity, respect for people's self-determination, non38. See

CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, UN-KEPT PROMISES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

GAZETTE
No. to, available at
OF THE
COMMISSION
AND THE COURT,
http://www.cejil.org/gacetas.cfn?id=17 (in Spanish). Except where otherwise noted, the CEJIL report
was the source of all information summarized in these bullet points.
39- Id.
40. Ley 288 de 1996, Diario Oficial, Ano CXXXII, N. 42826., Julio, 1996., Pag. I, available at
http:llwww.bernateygamboa.comespanolltextos__disponiblesleyes/LEY288-96.htm.
41. Id. para. 4
42. Ley No. 23506, Ley de Habeas Corpus y Amparo, available at http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/inst/
MGP/JCI/02-peru-leyhabeascorpusyamparo.htm.
43. It should nonetheless be noted that Peru systematically failed to comply with Commission
recommendations and repudiated the Court's jurisdiction under the Fujimori administration. It has
since retracted its repudiation and has improved compliance with Court Decisions. See infra Part III.B.
44. Ley No. 23506, Ley de Habeas Corpus y Amparo, supra note 42, art. 40.
THE

DECISIONS
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interference, and support for universal peace and democracy.
Honduras proclaims as unavoidable the validity and mandatory
execution of international arbitral and judicial decisions." 45
a Article 23 of Venezuela's 1999 Constitution affords constitutional
status to all human rights accords, treaties and conventions signed and
ratified by Venezuela, which are thus hierarchically superior
4 6to the
domestic law of that country, on par with the Constitution itself.
e The
Constitutions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru all make explicit reference (in the
form of a renvoi) to the rights enshrined in human rights treaties and
conventions to which the state is a party.47 Article 75, section 22 of
Argentina's Constitution provides that the American Declaration and
other international treaties, are
the American Convention, among
48
"hierarchically superior to laws."

While such measures are, without question, insufficient to guarantee
the effective implementation of decisions of the Inter-American
supervisory bodies, they nonetheless create mechanisms that activists
may call upon as part of their broader advocacy work. We will return to
this point later when we examine the ways in which social movements
have used such mechanisms to put pressure on governments to
implement change.
In 2001, the Commission began including in its annual reports a
summary of the status of compliance with its recommendations. The
most recent annual report published at this writing (2003) provides a
table with cumulative data on compliance from the preceding three
years.49 While the Commission notes that compliance "is meant to be
successive and not immediate and that some recommendations require a
reasonable time to be fully implemented," the table evidences a bleak
record overall. Of the sixty cases studied, the Commission found total
45. CONsrrruci6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS, art. 15 (authors' translation), available at
http://www.honduras.net/hondurasconstitution.htm. The original Spanish text reads:
Honduras hace suyos los principios y prcticas del derecho internacional que propenden a
la solidaridad humana, al respecto de la autodeterminaci6n de los pueblos, a la no
intervenci6n y al afianzamiento de lapaz y lademocracia universales.
Honduras proclama como ineludible la validez y obligatoria ejecuci6n de las sentencias
arbitrales y judiciales de carcter internacional.
46. CONSTITUCO6N DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, art. 23. The original Spanish
text reads, "Los tratados, pactos y convenciones relativos a derechos humanos, suscritos y ratificados
por Venezuela, tienen jerarqufa constitucional y prevalecen en el orden intemo, en lamedida en que
contengan normas sobre su goce y ejercicio mas favorable a las establecidas por esta Constituci6n y la
ley de la Republica, y son de aplicaci6n inmediata y directa por los tribunales y demos 6rganos del
Poder Piblico."
47. Ant6nio Augusto Cangado Trindade, Current State and Perspectives of the Inter-American
System of Human Rights Protection at the Dawn of the New Century, 8 TUL. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5
(2000).
48. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA NAC6N ARGENTINA, art. 75, § 22.
49. ANNUAL REPORT 2003, Inter-Am.C.H.R., ch. III, para. 76, OEA/ser. L.V/II.II8, doc. 5 rev. 2
(2003).
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compliance in just five; partial compliance, i.e., "those cases in which the
state has partially observed the recommendations made by the
[Commission] either by having complied with only one or some of them
or through incomplete compliance with all of them, 50 in twenty-nine;
and pending compliance, i.e. "those cases in which the [Commission]
considers that there has been no compliance with the recommendations
because no steps have been taken in that direction; because the state has
explicitly indicated that it will not comply with the recommendations
made; or because the state has not reported to the [Commission] and the
Commission has no information from other sources that would suggest
otherwise,"'" in twenty-six.
Similarly, the Inter-American Court has issued a number of
Resolutions on compliance, though in a less systematic fashion than the
Commission. Most recently, during its regular sessions held in November
2003, the Court issued fifteen resolutions regarding compliance with
sentences that had been issued as many as six years earlier. For example,
in the Caballero Delgado and Santana case,"2 in which the Court ordered
the State of Colombia to make reparations to the victims in 1997,
compliance with the majority of the measures ordered was still pending
as of November 2003.
An analysis of these resolutions suggests that states generally comply
with Court orders to pay monetary damages and costs to victims and/or
their next of kin, and sometimes comply with orders to make symbolic
reparations, such as naming public parks, schools, or streets after victims
or making a public apology or statement of responsibility for violations.53
In addition, states sometimes report taking steps to investigate the crimes
alleged and to punish the individuals responsible, and/or taking steps to
modify internal legislation to comply with international human rights
standards. It is important to note, however, that these latter types of
measures are rarely complied with in full. Some states, such as Peru
during the years of Fujimori's rule, systematically disregarded orders of
this nature,54 while others allege inability under domestic law to comply55
50. Id.

5I. Id.
52. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22 (1995).
53. See., e.g., Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(2003), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index_ing.html; Cantoral Benavides v. Peru (Compliance
with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2oo3), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index-ing.html.
54. See CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38.
55. In its resolutions on compliance, the Court expressly held that
pursuant to the treaty obligations assumed by the States, no provision of domestic law,
including the statute of limitations, may be invoked to fail to comply with the decisions of
the Court concerning the investigation and punishment of those responsible for human
rights violations. Otherwise, the rights embodied in the American Convention would be
deprived of effective protection. This understanding of the Court is in accordance with the
letter and the spirit of the Convention and also general principles of law; one of these
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or report only partial compliance (for example, taking preliminary steps
to investigate crimes, or prosecuting one of several alleged
perpetrators). 6 In other instances, states may simply fail provide any
information
to the Court, either entirely or with respect to particular
57
measures.
II.

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: ANALYSIS AND CASE
STUDIES FROM THE AMERICAS

Scholars and practitioners have devoted far more energy to the
study of jurisprudential aspects of the decisions of the Inter-American
human rights system than to assessing the degree to which these
decisions are implemented in practice. Yet it is precisely the
implementation of decisions and the impact of international oversight on
the degree of respect for human rights that should matter most to the
human rights community.
While international human rights practitioners seek to ensure that
international oversight bodies issue favorable decisions in individual
cases, they must also work to ensure that those sentences are
implemented. Further, resort to international oversight mechanisms is
ordinarily motivated by the desire to affect human rights practices
through changes in policy, and therefore aspires (or should aspire) to
more than merely achieving results in individual cases. The effect of
decisions in particular cases, the degree to which these decisions
themselves are implemented, and the connection between individual
cases and broader policies are thus topics that should be of vital
importance to international human rights practitioners. It should be
obvious to those involved in litigating and resolving individual cases in
the Inter-American system that the resulting decisions are, at best, one
element in a broad web of factors that may promote social change.
Yet, in practice, international human rights litigators frequently
ignore the broader web of factors. Faced with massive social inequity,
human rights lawyers in the Americas often construct sophisticated legal
principles is that of pacta sunt servanda, which requires that the provisions of a treaty should
be ensured effet util at the level of the domestic law of the States Parties.
Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 20 (2003),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index-ing.html. In the cases in which the Court ordered
compliance resolutions on November 27, 2003, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru all reported inability
under domestic legislation to comply with one or more of the Court's reparations orders. See id.;
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2oo3), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index ing.html; Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Compliance with
Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.ing.html.
56. See, e.g., Blake v. Guatemala (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2003),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index-ing.html.
57. See, e.g., Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.er/indexjing.html.
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arguments that cast particular instances of social injustice in the language
of state obligations and enforceable, individual rights-the currency of
international human rights litigation. Moreover, the lawyers,
commissioners, and judges responsible for resolving these claims may
view individual decisions as an opportunity to establish visionary
jurisprudence, and may respond positively to this approach. But such a
strategy has a number of drawbacks. As we argue, practitioners must
recognize the potential for counterproductive results, either due to
overreaching, leading to decisions unlikely to be enforced, or to excessive
emphasis on rights-based approaches to the detriment of other,
potentially more effective means of seeking change. Practitioners should
realize that, like any tool, litigation of cases is useful in some instances
but is less useful-and, in fact, may even be counterproductive-in
others.
Indeed, scholars of U.S. domestic practice have critiqued individual,
rights-based litigation as a means of effecting systemic change. These
scholars observe that rights-based approaches unfairly allow some
members of communities of victims to "queue jump.,

5

They also raise

fundamental doubts as to the effectiveness of litigation, in addition to its
potential to demobilize social movements and to strengthen the state (or
by analogy, the international oversight body) while fostering dependence
on attorneys. Their critiques consider rights-based approaches
generally,59 as well as specific areas such as women's rights, 6° race
58. As David Kennedy argues:
A right or entitlement is a trump card. In emancipating itself, the right holder is, in effect
queue jumping. But recognizing, implementing, and enforcing rights is distributional work.
Encouraging people to imagine themselves as right holders, and rights as absolute, makes
the negotiation of distributive arrangements among individuals and groups less likely and
less tenable. There is no one to triage among rights and right holders-except the state. The
absolutist legal vocabulary of rights makes it hard to assess distribution among favored and
less-favored right holders and forecloses development of a political process for trade-offs
among them, leaving only the vague suspicion that the more privileged get theirs at the
expense of the less privileged.
DAVID KENNEDY,

THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM

17

(2o04).

59. Critical legal scholar Peter Gabel and attorney Paul Harris have argued that "an excessive
preoccupation with 'rights-consciousness' tends in the long run to reinforce alienation and
powerlessness, because the appeal to rights inherently affirms that the source of social power resides in
the State rather than in the people themselves." Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and
Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, I I N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 369,
375 (1982-83); Hutchinson and Monahan have noted that "[i]n constructing elaborate schemes of legal
rights and entitlements ... mainstream legal theorists simply justify the prevailing conditions of social

life and erect formidable barriers to social change." Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Law,
Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Dramaof American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 199, 2o9 (1984).

6o. Some left feminist critics have questioned the campaign for pay equity on the basis that the
"legalistic, equal-rights-based strategy" has done more to reinforce an existing ideology that protects
privilege than to effect change based on distributive justice. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:
PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 228 (1994). These critics argue that the
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relations, 6' and environmental justice. 6' Similar criticisms have been
lodged in the supranational realm. For example, a recent article by
Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart argues that:
[I]nternational adjudication offers a dubious route toward economic
and social progress. In any event, it is certainly not the only or even the
best means of holding governments "accountable" for their human
rights obligations ....

At the international level, efforts to articulate a

single approach to the promotion and achievement of economic, social,
and cultural rights are bound to fail, given the -vastly differing
circumstances in which states parties find themselves.... We fear that
instead of advancing respect for, and implementation of, economic,
social, and cultural rights in states parties that to date have given them
short shrift, there is a significant risk that trying to "enforce" such
rights through binding international adjudication will have the opposite
result, causing states to deem hasize them and further undermining
their stature and acceptability.F
Dennis and Stewart contend that "[t]he call for formal, binding, case-bycase adjudication seems to us an example of overreaching legal
positivism, borne of the myth that judicial or quasi-judicial processes
intrinsically produce better, more insightful policy choices than, for
struggle for pay equity fails to challenge the larger "hegemonic liberal political discourse" with the
result that activists "court the danger of strengthening the ideological and social underpinnings of
women's subordination." Id. (quoting Johanna Brenner, Feminist PoliticalDiscourses:Radical Versus
Liberal Approaches to the Feminizationof Poverty and Comparable Worth, in WOMEN, CLASS AND THE
FEMINIST IMAGINATION, 491, 500 (Karen V. Hansen & Ilene J. Philipson eds. 19o)).

61. Commentators have noted that "[wihile Critical Race theorists share the disenchantment of
Critical Legal Studies with rights jurisprudence, they also recognize the important historical and social
role that rights approaches have played in the liberation of persons of color." Darren L. Hutchinson,
Factless Jurisprudence,34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 615, 632 (2003). Patricia Williams has explored
the black community's simultaneous embrace and skepticism of the concept of rights, observing that,
"[t]o say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also true that blacks believed in them
so much and so hard that we gave them life where there was none before." Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,
430 (1987). Roy Brooks has argued that the focus on the enforcement of formal equality between
blacks and whites has resulted not only in the movement's failure to achieve substantive equality, but
also in the exacerbation of problems affecting the African-American community as a group. See e.g.,
Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM (19o). Brooks argues that the focus on

equality of opportunity has enabled African Americans in the highest economic and social classes to
access education, housing and employment opportunities previously restricted to whites. Brooks
contends that middle class and working class African Americans, however, have been left behind in
communities whose leaders have abandoned them for social mobility. Brooks' solution focuses on the
need for a massive program of African American self-help.
62. Luke Cole has argued that litigation places the attorney in a position of control vis-A-vis those
affected by environmental abuse and insists that "[tihe lawyer who wants to serve pollution's victims
must put her skills to the task of helping those people organize themselves." Luke W. Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Law: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 649 (1992). Cole also questions whether courtrooms are the most advantageous
place for poor victims of environmental injustice and whether winning may be counterproductive.
63. Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water,
Housing, Health?,98 AM J. INT'L L. 462,467 (2004).
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example, their legislative counterparts. ' '6' They base their bleak view of
the prospects offered by international adjudication of economic, social,
and cultural rights on their view of a series of factors, including the
limited capacity of the oversight body, costs involved in litigation, and
the likely failure of states to comply with decisions in individual cases.6
The critique offered by Dennis and Stewart may well be accurate
insofar as it seeks to challenge the notion that an individual complaints
mechanism for economic, social, and cultural rights can, by itself,
transform societies by effectuating wide scale social justice, economic
redistribution, or the like. We agree that no supranational litigation
mechanism offers such vast promise. This critique is consistent with our
position that economic, social and cultural rights are best advanced
through integrated advocacy strategies, including litigation focused on
civil and political rights. But the incapacity of supranational litigation to
resolve all problems in a given area or to supplant other valuable means
of effecting change does not render it of no use.
Notwithstanding the Dennis-Stewart critique, scholars such as
Martha Minow have argued-and we agree-that while rights-based
litigation of individual cases is insufficient to bring about social change, it
can be a valuable tool as part of a "mass movement[] with legislative,
regulatory and protest dimensions."6 Furthermore, in the context of
international human rights litigation, additional factors, specific to the
role of international oversight mechanisms, offset the tension that exists
in the domestic context between rights-based litigation and grassroots
social movements. These factors involve the mobilizing power within
countries that is afforded to the intelligent use of international oversight
mechanisms.
In varying degrees, states in the Americas (and in the rest of the
world) legitimate themselves through their insertion in international
organizations, structures and discourse. 67 This internal legitimization
process can empower actors-whether social movements, NGOs, or
lawyers-to the extent they are able to tap into the strength of
international networks and intergovernmental oversight bodies. As the
case studies below demonstrate, the force of oversight bodies goes far
beyond their legal powers, which are rarely, if ever, what matters most
64. Id. at 466.
65. Id.
66. Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC 171, 173 (1993). As Minow notes,
litigation is frequently used as a means to an end. "Many contemporary reformers file test case
lawsuits with the goal of gaining a place on the evening news and influencing legislative agendas,
regardless of whether or not they prevail in court." Id. at 173 (citing NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE
FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980'S AND BEYOND (1989)).

67. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
InternationalHuman Rights Law, forthcoming, 54 DUKE L.J. (2004); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
Toward an InstitutionalTheory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (20O3).
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within the country whose abuses are subject to adjudication. It is the fact
of international rebuke or condemnation that is of greatest import to
those seeking to challenge state abuses within a given country. And those
seeking to challenge the state often include trade unions, student
movements, women's organizations, landless peasants, prisoners' rights
groups, etc. These social movements may thus be empowered by
international litigation rather than marginalized by it. Indeed, as we
recommend in this article, when international human rights advocacy is
carried out most effectively-that is, jointly with social movements and
focusing on areas that will strengthen efforts to transform unjust
elements of particular societies-the "queue-jumping" tensions
dissipate.68
Insofar as international litigation resembles the context critiqued by
some critical legal studies scholars-that is, in which lawyers are isolated
from, rather than collaborate with, social movements-it is indeed likely
to be ineffective. Yet if practitioners envision supranational litigation as
merely one element among many of an integrated advocacy strategy, and
if they work jointly with social movements, they may avoid the dangers
observed by critical legal studies in the domestic context.
Douglass Cassel has captured this idea with the following image:
What pulls human rights forward is not a series of separate, parallel
cords, but a "rope" of multiple, interwoven strands. Remove one
strand, and the entire rope is weakened. International human rights
law is a strand woven throughout the length of the rope. Its main value
is not in how much rights protection
69 it can pull as a single strand, but in
how it strengthens the entire rope.
Although Cassel does not address economic, social, and cultural
rights in his analysis,7" we believe that international human rights law can
be an important tool for the expansion of economic, social, and cultural
rights in the Inter-American system. As he notes:
[I]nternational human rights law has shown itself to be a useful tool for
rights protection. Most important are its indirect effects. International
articulation of rights norms has reshaped domestic dialogues in law,
politics, academia, public consciousness, civil society, and the press.
International human rights law also facilitates international and
transnational processes that reinforce, stimulate, and monitor these
68. The sense of litigation as "queue jumping" is clearly present in the case of supranational
mechanisms, though with a broader range of potential queue jumpers. Thus, for example, access to
supranational mechanisms allows groups that may never gain effective access to domestic litigation to
place issues on the national stage. These groups may be the usual insiders, but they may also be groups
excluded by virtue of their remote location, the grassroots nature of their work, or other factors.
69. Douglass Cassel, Does InternationalHuman Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
121,

123 (2001).

While Cassel does not argue that his analysis is inapplicable to economic, social, and cultural
rights, he expressly excludes from the scope of his article an analysis of how international human rights
law can shape the promotion of these rights. See id. at 124.
70.
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domestic dialogues. While reliable quantitative measurement is
probably impossible, by strengthening domestic rights institutions,
international human rights law has brought incalculable, indirect
benefits for rights protection."

A.

BRAZIL

In Brazil, the degree to which Inter-American decisions have
achieved real-world impact has not varied in relation to the importance
of the Commission or the Court's action in a particular case, but instead
has been a function of media and public interest in the matter, and the
extent to which the government has been pressured to respond.72 In many
instances, the media have not reacted to the actions of the Commission at
the key moments in the litigation, but rather have responded in
accordance with a different agenda established within Brazil:
Thus, for example, when the Commission issued its final report [in
April 2000], holding the Brazilian State responsible for the October
1992 massacre of i i i prisoners in the Carandiru prison complex,73 the
most serious single human rights violation in recent Brazilian history,
the matter hardly registered in the media. Yet in the days immediately
preceding [scheduled] trial dates of the commander of the Carandiru
massacre, Col. Ubiratan Guimaraes, [and during subsequent coverage
of civil suits seeking indemnification,] the media provided ample
coverage of the Commission's report.74

A similar result followed in the case of a series of homicides of
young boys in the state of Maranhao that were denounced to the
Commission in July 200I. 7s While the Commission's decision to open the
first of two cases provoked a moderate initial media response, the
October 2001 murder of two more boys in similar circumstances led the
domestic and international press to provide extensive coverage of the
Inter-American system's involvement in the matter. 76 This pressure, in
71. Id. at 123.
72. See generally James L. Cavallaro, Toward Fair Play: A Decade of Transformation and
Resistance in InternationalHuman Rights Advocacy in Brazil, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 481 (2002).
73. Carandiru, Case 11.291, Inter-Am. C.H.R, Report No. 34/00, OEA/Ser.LV/II.io6, doc. 6 rev.

(2o00).
74. Cavallaro, supra note 72, at 488. See, e.g., FlAvia de Leon, Lider de aqfo no Carandiru sera
S. PAULO, May 23, 2000 (focusing on the upcoming trial of the police
officer responsible for overseeing the massacre and citing, in the course of the article, the proceedings
before the Commission); Flivia de Leon, Comega hoje julgamento de coronel acusado de comandar
massacre, FOLHA DE S. PAULO, Nov. 29, 2000 (focusing on impending trial of commander of the
Canrandiru massacre and citing the Commission's determinations in the matter); Parentesde mortos
no Massacre do Carandiruaguardam indenizagdo, FOLHA DE S. PAULO, Sept. 29, 2002 (focusing on the
delays in payment of indemnifications to family members of those killed in the massacre and citing the
proceedings in the Inter-American Commission.).
75. See Petition on behalf of Rani8 Silva Cruz, filed on July 26, 2001, available at
http://www.global.org.br.
76. Xico Sa, Castraqdo de garotos assombra o Maranhdo, FOLHA DE S. PAULO, Oct. 28, 2001
(focusing on the most recent homicide and providing extensive information on the petition filed

julgado em 8 de julho, FOLHA DE
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turn, led the Ministry of Justice to place the Federal Police at the
disposition of state authorities to assist in the investigation. The pressure,
which stemmed in large part from the Commission's involvement in, and
the media coverage of the case, eventually forced Maranhdo's governor
and then-leading presidential candidate, Roseana Sarney, to allow
federal, rather than state, investigation of the killings.
It is apparent that the impact of the Commission's decisions depends
largely on a series of extra-legal factors. Primary among these is the role
of the media, and its power to affect policy should not be
underestimated. A significant part of human rights activism in Brazil,
including international rights litigation, involves use of the press to put
pressure on the government in individual cases and on policy issues.
I. The Urso Branco Case"
In June of 2004, hearings were held in the first case against Brazil to
be heard by the Inter-American Court. The case involved the Urso
Branco penitentiary in the remote state of Rond6nia, in which both
official brutality and prisoner-on-prisoner violence have claimed the lives
of a shockingly high number of prisoners. The most violent clash prior to
the beginning of the Inter-American system's involvement - a two-day
riot in which authorities deliberately placed prisoners from rival groups
together, under circumstances in which it was clear that a violent clash
would result, then failed to take measures to stop the twenty-hour killing
spree that ensued-left twenty-seven detainees dead in January 2002.
Given the repeated acts of violence after this massacre, several of which
resulted in additional fatalities, advocates sought precautionary measures
from the Commission. Even after these were granted, five detainees were
killed over a period of two months. Based on these killings, incidents of
beatings and torture, and constant threats made by guards and police
against detainees, the petitioners in the case requested that the
Commission seek provisional measures from the Inter-American Court.
For the first time in a matter involving Brazil, the Commission solicited
these measures from the Court, which, in an unprecedented and

several weeks earlier); see also Agencia Estado, OEA abre inqu~rito sobre meninos emasculados no
Maranhao, FOLHA DE S. PAULO, Nov. 29, 2001 (focusing on the second petition to the Inter-American

at
available
killings),
October
the
after
filed
Commission,
http:/lwww.estado.com.br/agestado/noticias/2ooi/nov/29/27o.htm. The extensive coverage provided to
the matter in the Brazilian media led foreign journalists to address the ritualistic killings as well. See,
e.g., Anthony Faiola, Witchcraft Murders Cast a Grusome Spell, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 20O, at C1.
77. On June 6, 2002, the Inter-American Commission submitted to the Inter-American Court a
petition requesting that it order the State of Brazil to take urgent measures to protect the lives and
physical integrity of inmates at the Jose Mario Alyes Detention Center-known as "Urso Branco."
The facts summarized in this section are recited in the Court's Order. See Order, Case of Urso Branco
Prison, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (June 18, 2002), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/indexjing.html (last
viewed Nov. 28, 2004).
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sweeping decision, granted the request in June 2002..
Nevertheless, despite repeated orders by both the Commission 79 and
the Court,"' it has been extremely difficult to force the isolated
authorities in Rond6nia to cede to international pressure. While federal
authorities-far more sensitive now to the international stigma attached
to litigation before the Inter-American Court-have demonstrated
interest in complying with the system's orders, they have been either
unwilling or unable to force local prison administrators, guards, and
police to alter their abusive policies. Indeed, a recent violent episode in
which at least nine people were killed and over 16o held hostage by
rioting prisoners led the Commission to issue a public appeal to the
Brazilian government, on April 21, 2004, to take adequate measures to
comply with the Court's orders.8 Unlike determinations made by the
Commission and the Court at early stages of the process, the Court's
decision to order a hearing in the matter provoked a significant media
response. After holding hearings in June 2004, the Court issued a third
resolution enjoining Brazil to take specific steps to protect the lives and
physical integrity of Urso Branco prisoners.2 In responding to events in
Brazil, the media were able to point to the Court's determination to
convey the gravity of the situation and the failure of the government.'
Yet even this response by the national media and the successive orders of
the Inter-American Court have resulted in limited impact in Rond6nia,
78. Id. at para. 5-6. In this first-ever decision on Brazil, the Court based its order that Brazil
provide updated information on the detainees held at the Urso Branco prison on guidelines
established in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners. In so
doing, the Court granted binding status to at least some of the provisions in the Standard Minimum
Rules, a significant legal advance in the protection of persons in detention in the Americas. Id. at para.
7, n.3 (citing United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. StandardMinimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Geneva in 1955, and adopted by the Economic and
Social Council through resolutions 663C (XXIV) of July 31, 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of May 13, 1977,
Rule 7(1)).
79. The Commission does not publish the text of its determinations granting precautionary
measures, but it does summarize these decisions in its annual reports. See PrecautionaryMeasures
Granted or Extended by the Commission in 2002, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. III(C)(i), para. 14,
OEA/Ser.IJV/II.ii 7 , doc. irev. I (2002). The full text of the Commission's decision is on file with the
authors.
8o. Orders, Case of Urso Branco Prison, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (June i8, 2002; Aug. 29, 2002; and
Apr. 22, 2004), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriee-ing/index.html.
81. Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Expresses its Concern Over
the Situation in the Urso Branco Prison in Brazil, Inter-Am. C.H.R., No. 13/04 (Mar. i9,2004),
availableat http://www.cidh-org/comunicados/English/2004/I 3 .o4.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
82. Order, Urso Branco Prison Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (July 7, 2004), available at
http:l/www.corteidh.or.cr/seriee-inglindex.html.
83. See, e.g., Agencia Estado, Crise na prisdo, Urso Branco leva o Brasil a se explicar na OEA,
AGENCIA ESTADO, May 20, 2004 (focusing on the Court's grave concerns with abuses at the Urso
Branco prison, upcoming sessions, and the government's failure to comply with measures ordered
previously), availableat http://www.Estadao.com.br/print/2oo 4 /mai/2o/17 6.htm.
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due largely to the state's isolation within Brazil and the weak
constituency in defense of the rights of prisoners.
4
2. 42nd Police District Case8
This case, which involved the massacre of eighteen prisoners
following an aborted escape attempt in February 1989, illustrates that a
final determination on the merits of a particular case may not always be
the most effective means of achieving justice, even in the individual case.
After eight years of litigation in which the Brazilian State consistently
and repeatedly missed deadlines and failed to engage the Inter-American
system seriously, the Commission prepared a final report condemning
the State of Brazil for violations of both the Convention and the
Declaration. Shortly before that report was to be published, the Brazilian
government expressed its interest in reaching a friendly solution with the
petitioners.
The petitioners were initially loath to agree to a friendly settlement,
as it seemed that to do so would merely reward the State for its repeated
failures with the opportunity to avoid public condemnation by the
Commission in what would have been the first case holding Brazil
responsible for human rights violations since the State's 1992 ratification
of the American Convention on Human Rights. Ultimately, however,
petitioners perceived that the position of the Brazilian State was far from
monolithic. While the authorities formally responsible for responding to
proceedings in the Inter-American system had demonstrated little
concern with the case, the National Human Rights Secretariat-recently
created at that time -and the local authorities in Sdo Paulo State showed
genuine interest in resolving the matter.
Petitioners agreed to meet with representatives of the Commission
and Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Relations. It soon became clear that
while the Ministry representatives were prepared to offer very little in
terms of a solution, their counterparts in Sdo Paulo, where the violations
had occurred, were more willing to make critical concessions. In followup negotiations with the authorities in Sdo Paulo, which were attended
by high-ranking state officials and the National Human Rights Secretary,
petitioners managed to obtain the key points that the victims were
seeking in the case: substantial compensation for their families,
prosecution of those responsible in the ordinary courts rather than in
specialized military tribunals, and public recognition by the government
of its responsibility for the killings. The decision to overlook repeated
procedural violations, even at the expense of an immediate public
condemnation of the State, paid off. The terms that the petitioners were
84. The facts recited in this section are set forth in the Parque S~o Lucas v. Brazil, Case 10.301,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/03, OEA/Ser./L/V/LI.114, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2003), available at http://
www.cidh.org/annualrep/2oo3eng/brazil.103o .htm.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:217

able to negotiate through the friendly settlement process exceeded any
reasonable expectations of government implementation if these
recommendations had been included in a final report at the time.
Ultimately, Brazil failed to comply with the all of the provisions
agreed to in the friendly settlement, and the Commission published a
report condemning Brazil in October of 2003.85 The report notes,
however, that a number of the agreed provisions had been implemented,
including the prosecution and subsequent conviction and incarceration of
one of the individuals responsible for the violations; the payment of
damages to the next of kin of a number of the victims; and relevant
changes in Brazilian legislation. Much like in the Urso Branco case,
despite elite pressure and the existence of some sympathetic government
officials, the absence of a popular constituency or broad social movement
in support of the prison victims undermined the effect of the
Commission's determination in the matter.
B.

PERU

Peru's relationship with the Inter-American system suffered a series
of radical transformations resulting from internal political pressures on
successive governments. The low point, from the perspective of rights
defenders, was the Fujimori administration's 1999 attempt to withdraw
the State's recognition of the Court's jurisdiction. Although Peru's
attempted withdrawal, which the Court itself flatly rejected, 6 was a direct
response to the Court's adverse decision in the Castillo Petruzzi case,"' it
also sought to avoid the possibility of further adverse decisions in two
important and highly politicized matters. 8' A comparison of two cases,
Loayza Tamayo 9 and CastilloPetruzzi, allows us to examine some of the
factors that determine the extent to which Court decisions have achieved
real-world impact in Peru.

85. See id.
86. See Ivcher Bronstein Case Competence, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 para 56(1) (1999).
The Court held "[tlhere is no provision in the Convention that expressly permits the States Parties to
withdraw their declaration of recognition of the Court's binding jurisdiction. Nor does the instrument
in which Peru recognizes the Court's jurisdiction, dated January 21, 1981, allow for that possibility."
Id. para. 39. The Court further held that it would continue to adjudicate the pending matters against
Peru, id. para. 55-56, and ultimately declared Peru responsible for violations of the Convention in
both cases. Ivcher Bronstein Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 para. 19(i)-(5) (2001).
87. Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33 (997). We discuss this case in
depth below.
88. The Ivcher Bronstein case and the Constitutional Court case, both of which were pending
before the Court, implicated allies of the President. Some human rights groups claim that Fujimori's
response to the Castillo Petruzzi decision was at least partly motivated by his desire for the Court not
to hear these cases.
89. Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33 (1997).
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i. Loayza Tamayo'
Peruvian security forces seized Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo, a
Peruvian national and university professor, without a warrant, on
February 6, 1993 after she was named as a member of the guerrilla group
Shining Path. Peruvian security forces held Loayza Tamayo
incommunicado for ten days, during which time they tortured her and
subjected her to cruel and degrading treatment and unlawful pressure.
Then Peruvian authorities accused her of treason and brought her before
a special military tribunal. A series of trials in both military and civil
jurisdictions led to conviction by a "faceless" special tribunal of the civil
courts, which sentenced Loayza Tamayo to twenty years' imprisonment.
The Inter-American Commission determined that Peru had violated
Loayza Tamayo's rights to personal liberty, humane treatment, and
judicial protection as enshrined in the American Convention and
recommended that she be released immediately. Peru rejected the
Commission's analysis and failed to implement its recommendations on
the ground that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. The
Commission forwarded the case to the Court and urged Peru to take
precautionary measures on her behalf.
The Court confirmed the Commission's allegations and ordered
Loayza Tamayo's release, her reinstatement as a university professor,
and a series of compensatory measures.9 She was released from prison
shortly thereafter.
The Loayza Tamayo case captured the interest of both the domestic
and the international communities. From the time of Loayza Tamayo's
arrest in 1993 until her release in 1997, a strong popular movement on

her behalf generated substantial media attention. In addition, the facts
that came to light tended to inspire sympathy among observers. This
factor, among others, contributed to making this a "good" case-one in
which a decision by the Inter-American Court would be difficult for the
state to ignore.
Loayza Tamayo was a university professor, educated, and articulate.
In addition, she had educated and articulate advocates with access to
substantial resources and ties to the human rights movement: her sister,
Carolina Loayza was a professor of humanitarian law at the University of
Lima who was able to enlist the help of CEJIL, an international human
rights organization, to bring the case to the Commission. Furthermore,
Loayza Tamayo's guilt was far from clear, and her story resonated with
the public, as it brought to light abusive state practices from which
hundreds of other Peruvians suffered.

90. See id., para. 3, for this factual summary.

9.

Id.
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The Loayza sisters did not merely fight the State in the courts, they
also mounted a media campaign to influence public opinion. In 1995,
Maria Elena sent a letter from prison to Amnesty International
describing in explicit detail how she had been tortured, and specifically
how she had been raped repeatedly throughout her ten days of
incommunicado detention. Furthermore, she publicly refuted the charges
against her, and denounced the activities of the Shining Path.
Carolina, meanwhile, brought local attention to the case. In spite of
Fujimori's tight control over the media, a number of journalists reported
on Maria Elena's arrest, detention, and abuse. Rights activists in Peru
and abroad, including Carolina herself, attribute much of their success to
media pressure in the case.9"
Indeed, while the Inter-American Court's decision in the case was
undoubtedly an important factor in the Peruvian government's decision
to release Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo, it was only one of a number of
factors working in her favor. In fact, other elements of the Court's
decision-including its order that Peru ensure payment of the victim's
full retirement benefits, and that it modify the internal legislation under
which she had been convicted to conform with Inter-American human
rights norms-that had not been the object of public attention or concern
in the way that her release from prison had, still had not been
implemented as of the Court's Resolution on Compliance of November
27, 2003.'

92. After her sister's release and the fall of Fujimori, Carolina wrote a letter to the magazine
Caretas,in which she publicly thanked a journalist for reporting on her sister's case, which she believed
influenced its positive outcome. Carolina Loayza, Letter, Nos Escriben y Contestamos, CARETAS, Oct.
9, 1997, available at http:/www.caretas.com.pe/1486/cartas/cartas.htm. The original Spanish text reads:
Lima, 2 de octubre de 1997.
En nombre de mi hermana Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo deseo expresarles mi profundo
agradecimiento por el apoyo que desde el primer momento tuvieron a bien brindarle, en
este caso el de una inocente injustamente condenada. Especial menci6n quiero hacer al
periodista Jimmy Torres por su solidaridad y humanidad. Si bien Maria Elena atin no
obtiene su libertad tal como 1o ha ordenado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, en un fallo hist6rico y sin precedentes, considera que 6ste es el momento de
agradecer a quienes creyeron en ella y asumieron su defensa en todo momento.
Carolina Loayza
Id.
93. See Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2003). In its
merits and reparations judgments, the Court ordered Peru to release Maria Elena from prison; to
reinstate her to her public university position; to ensure payment of her retirement benefits; to vacate
any adverse domestic sentences against her based on the facts related to the case; to investigate and
punish the individuals responsible for her abuse; to pay damages and costs to Maria Elena and her
next of kin; and to modify internal legislation to conform to inter-American standards. Id. at 1-2. As
of November 2003, the State had only fully complied with its obligations to release Maria Elena and to
pay damages and costs, and had partially complied with its obligation to reinstate her. Id. at 8-io. The
Court found that compliance with the remaining provisions of its order was still pending. Id.
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2.
Castillo Petruzzi'
The Castillo Petruzzi case involved four Chilean nationals serving
life sentences in Peru after being arrested on terrorism charges and
convicted of treason by a "faceless" military tribunal. Upon receiving a
petition on behalf of the victims, the Commission issued a report in
which it found Peru responsible for a number of Convention violations.
The Commission recommended that the State nullify the proceedings
against the victims and grant them "a new trial in the regular court
system, with full guarantees of due process."95 Peru rejected the
Commission's analysis and declined to implement its recommendations.
The Commission then forwarded the case to the Inter-American Court,
which upheld the Commission's findings and ordered that the victims be
retried. The Court further ordered Peru "to adopt the appropriate
measures to amend those laws that this judgment has declared to be in
violation of the American Convention on Human Rights."96

The State quickly responded to the Court's decision, forwarding an
Order of the Plenary Court of the Supreme Council of Military Justice,
which held that the Inter-American Court's decision "lack[ed]
impartiality and infringe[d] on the Political Constitution of the State,
being, therefore, impossible to execute."' Fujimori publicly announced
that his government had no intention of carrying out the Court's
sentence on the purported basis that implementation of the ruling would
lead to the release of thousands of convicted terrorists-an argument
that, according to Human Rights Watch "had no basis in fact and
seriously misled the Peruvian public."' Indeed, the argument seemed
calculated to appeal to the public's fear of terrorist activity in a time of
social upheaval. Shortly thereafter, a Peruvian Council of Ministers
proposed a legislative resolution purporting to retract the State's
recognition of the Court's jurisdiction, and on July 8, 1999, the Peruvian
Congress approved the resolution."
The decision by Congress was taken amid a heated debate in the
94. This factual summary is based on the recitation of the facts in Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52 (1999).
95. Id., para. 16.
96. Id., para. 226.
97. Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru (Compliance With Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (i999) (quoting
June I t, 1999 Order of the Plenary Court of the Supreme Council of Military Justice).
98. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000, PERU, HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, available
at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/americas-o8.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
99. Legislative Resolution No. 27152, of July 8, 1999. This legislation was repealed by Legislative
Resolution No. 27401 , published Jan. 19, 2001 in the official gazette El Peruano. See Withdrawal from
the jurisdiction of the Court by the Peruvian State, reprinted in Annual Report 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. 351, OEA/Ser.LV/III. 4 7, doc. 6 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/
Annuals/app16-99.html; Draft Follow-up Report on Compliance by the Peruvian State with the
Recommendations made by the IACHR in the IACHR's Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Peru (2000), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser./L/VII.t t4, doc. 5 rev. 16 (2002).
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media. The government framed the debate in terms of state sovereignty
and the appropriate limits on the authority of the Inter-American Court,
avoiding the issue of respect for substantive human rights norms. Groups
opposing the government's position followed the government's lead and
grounded their positions in formalistic arguments about international
law.'" With the debate cast in these terms, issues such as justice with
respect to the victims in the particular case were obscured. Furthermore,
the victims themselves were less sympathetic than Maria Elena Loayza
Tamayo had been. Their innocence was not clear, and their status as
outsiders (Chilean nationals being tried for crimes allegedly committed
in Peru) was regularly evoked by the Peruvian media. For all of these
reasons, the case failed to gain the support of the Peruvian public.
At the end of 2000, the Fujimori government collapsed amid a major
political corruption scandal, during which Vladimiro MontesinosFujimori's advisor and head of the National Intelligence Service-was
filmed accepting bribes, and the Peruvian Congress declared Fujimori
himself morally unfit for service.'0 ' After the regime change, the new
government repealed the legislative resolution purporting to withdraw
Peru's recognition of the Court's jurisdiction.' Both the Court and the
Commission continued to monitor Peru's compliance with InterAmerican decisions. The Commission issued a report in 2000 in which it
reiterated, among other recommendations, the Court's orders in Castillo
Petruzzi. 3 When the Commission revisited these issues in 2002, it found
that some progress had been made toward compliance, particularly in the
judicial sphere, but that the legislative changes ordered by the Court and
reiterated by the Commission had not been implemented. 4
Peru's failure to comply fully with the Court's decision in Castillo
Petruzzi, even after the fall of Fujimori and the State's renewed
recognition of the Court's jurisdiction, is attributable, in part, to the
public's inability or unwillingness to exert pressure on the State to
comply with the decision. That is, in the absence of a robust, popular
movement to demand respect for the rights embodied in Court decisions
too. See, e.g., Francisco Sober6n Garrido, Las falacias del gobierno peruano, in Agencia
Latinoamericana de Informaci6n, America Latina en Movimiento (July 28, 1999), available at
,
http://alainet.org/docs/476.html (last visited Oct. 31 2004).
ioI. See, e.g., The Charges Against Montesinos, BBC News, June 25, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/world/americas/14o762I.Stm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH,

WORLD

REPORT

2002, PERU,

HUMAN

RIGHTS

DEVELOPMENTS,

available at http://hrw.org-

wr2k2/americas9.html.
102. See Draft Follow-up Report on Compliance by the Peruvian State with the Recommendations
made by the IACHR in the IACHR's Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru (2ooo), InterAm. C.H.R.,OEAlser.LIV1II.i 14, doc. 5 rev. (2002).
103. Second Report on Human Rights in Peru (2000), Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. V,
OEA/ser.L/V/II. io6, doc. 59 rev. (2000), availableat http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Peru2oooen/
TOC.htm.
104. Id. ch. III(B)(I)(c).

December

2004]

LESS AS MORE

(absent either because repressive measures have stifled any such
movement, or because of public support for stringent security measures
in the context of social unrest, even at the expense of respect for human
rights), such decisions have provoked little real-world impact, as in the
Castillo Petruzzi case.

C.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: DENUNCIATION OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION

Another striking example in which adverse rulings gave rise to an
extreme reaction by the state was Trinidad and Tobago's denunciation of
the Convention in May of 1998. The move came as a response to the
Commission's ongoing investigation of the State's application of the
death penalty"° and after the Court ordered the State to suspend a
number of scheduled executions while it examined the practice in several
cases pending before it.' ° In blatant violation of the Court's order,
Trinidad and Tobago proceeded with the execution of six individuals
convicted in a domestically significant case.
The State alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiction in the pending
cases. Rejecting the State's argument, the Court found that Trinidad and
Tobago's application of the death penalty violated the Convention and
ordered that the State "abstain from applying the Offences Against the
Person Act of 1925 and within a reasonable period of time [to] modify
said Act to comply with international norms of human rights
protection."'" The Court also ordered the State to take measures to
compensate the family members of the victims, and to review and retry
specific cases in which the death penalty had been applied.' °8 Although
the Court directed the State to report periodically on its compliance with
the Court's orders, the Court issued an opinion regarding compliance on
November 27, 2003, in which it observed that the State had not made any
such reports."°
The social climate in which the State defied the Court's orders was
characterized by deep-seated tensions between the local population's
overwhelming support for capital punishment and the international
community's sustained pressure on Trinidad and Tobago and other
Caribbean nations to modify their current practice."' One salient feature
105. See e.g., Anthony Briggs, Case 11.815, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 44/99,
OEA/ser.LV./II.io2, doc. 6 rev. (I99). In the course of the Commission's investigation of this case,
the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago stated that the "Commission has no power to challenge
the implementation of a sentence of death imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction in Trinidad
and Tobago." Id. para. 4.
lo6. Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (2002).
1O7. Id. para. 223(8).
lo8. Id. para. 223(1o)-(13).
lO9. Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago (Compliance with Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 27,
2003), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index-ing.html.
1io. See

Privy

Council Blocks

Executions, BBC

NEWS,

May

i8,

1999,

available at
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of this tension is the fact that although Trinidad and Tobago has been an
independent nation since 1976, the judicial instance of last resort in the
country is the British Privy Council, which has the authority to stay the
executions of individuals sentenced to death under local law. In fact, the
Privy Council has stayed several executions in Trinidad and Tobago,
including several cases giving rise to petitions in the Inter-American
system."' While the United Kingdom has tried to persuade its former
colonies to abolish the death penalty for years, local support for capital
punishment has neutralized international pressure.
In this context, the State's repudiation of the authority of the InterAmerican system may be seen not only as an expression of state
sovereignty, but also as a vindication of popular sentiment and rejection
of a system imposed by colonial rule. Trinidad and Tobago's response to
the Court's orders underscores the limits of what Inter-American
decisions can achieve when they run counter not only to state interest (as
is often the case) but also to popular sentiment. In this regard, one is
reminded of the limited impact of the Urso Branco resolutions in Brazil,
largely due to the absence of popular support for the underlying causerespect for the rights of prisoners.
D.

CASE STUDIES-CONCLUSIONS

Experience counsels that governments accept the sentences of the
Court when a series of conditions are met. The first concerns the
legitimacy of the Court and of the Inter-American system itself. A state
will accept and implement decisions of the Court to the extent that
within its internal political system, the Inter-American system, and the
Court in particular, are recognized as legitimate. As a legal matter, this
recognition may be codified in law."' But the legitimacy inquiry should
not be limited to legislation. In order for states to recognize and
implement decisions -particularly
ones that are not favorable
politically-the legitimacy of the Court must be accepted by political
forces, civil society, and the media.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/world/americas/3465I3.stm.
iii. See, e.g., Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (2002)
(consolidating a number of cases involving the death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago); see also Haniff
Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 43/98,
OEA/Ser.L/V/I1.1o2, doc. 6 rev. (i999); Mohammed v. Trinidad and Tobago, Petition 12.401, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 50/02, OEA/ser. L./V./II.I I7, doc. i rev. i (2003); Ramlogan v. Trinidad and
Tobago, Petition 12.355, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/o2, OEA/ser. L/V./II.1t7, doc. i rev. i
(2oo3). It is worth noting that in the vast majority of these cases, victims were represented in the interAmerican system by London-based solicitors.
112. See, e.g., VICTOR MANUEL RODRfGUEZ RESCIA, LA EECUCI6N DE SENTENCIAS DE LA CORTE
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (Dr. Hugo Alfonso Mufioz Quesada et al. eds. 1997)
(surveying the constitutional and sub-constitutional norms giving legal force to determinations of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Latin American nations, in particular, Colombia, Peru,
Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Nicaragua).
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Even when a state accepts the legitimacy of the Inter-American
system in principle, it may fail or refuse to implement particular
decisions, as the examples of Peru and Trinidad and Tobago illustrate.
Thus, we posit that in order for states to implement decisions of the
Commission or Court, at a minimum, they must be convinced of their
legitimacy as a matter of law. In this regard, to the extent these bodies
seek to extend legal protections to economic, social, and cultural rights,
they should seek firm ground on which to anchor their decisions.
The case studies also demonstrate several important principles that
enable us to understand when cases are likely to have an impact
domestically. First, it appears vital, if not indispensable, that
international litigation be one element of a broader strategy to mobilize
for change. Other elements in this strategy include work with supportive
journalists, as in Loayza Tamayo and several of the Brazilian cases cited,
and with grassroots and international movements. Litigation strategies
not linked in this way, as has been the case with the death penalty
challenges in Trinidad and Tobago, are almost certainly destined to fail,
regardless of the outcome achieved in Court.
Second, advocates must bear in mind that a final determination on
the merits of a case by the Commission or the Court may not be the most
effective tool for achieving justice, even in the individual case, as states
may be more likely in some cases to enforce negotiated settlements than
Commission or Court orders. Again, this point serves as a lesson to
lawyers that they must be mindful of their role in the larger movement,
and should not remain obstinately focused on achieving legal judgments
that may have little effect.
Finally, a few important lessons may be drawn with regard to timing.
First, advocates must accept a great deal of unpredictability. Regime
change and national political agendas are forces that are difficult to
foresee with any degree of certainty. Litigants must recognize this and be
ready and able to advocate for their case or issue when the political
moment in the country so permits. They must also recognize that the
impact of cases will rarely be established by the timetable of litigation.
Rather, as the case studies above have demonstrated, points in which
pressure will be effective are primarily set by domestic political agendas,
social movements, and other non-legal forces. To be effective,
international litigants must accept their often secondary or supporting
roles and be prepared to advocate domestically when advantageous.
III.

ADVANCING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS THROUGH
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

While most of the American States have formally accepted the
theoretical basis for recognizing economic, social, and cultural rights,
practice tends to reflect the traditional, generational approach to human
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rights. This approach makes a distinction between civil and political
rights on the one hand (which are understood to impose specific,
justiciable obligations on states, and which are regularly enforced by
mechanisms for human rights protection) and economic, social, and
cultural rights on the other (whose concomitant obligations are less clear,
and whose enforcement has been more complicated).
The traditional classification framework posits that civil and political
rights are fundamentally different in nature from economic, social, and
cultural rights in that the former are rights of "negative liberty,"
requiring only that the state abstain from particular acts that would
violate individual freedoms, while the latter require action on the part of
the state to assure their implementation. Thus, for example, on this view,
to guarantee civil and political rights, such as the right to life or the right
to freedom of speech, the state need only not kill, in the first case, and
not limit free speech, in the second. By contrast, to ensure the enjoyment
of economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to education or
the right to health, the state must engage in positive action: construction
of schools, hiring of professors, etc., to ensure educational rights; training
of medical staff, construction of hospitals, provision of medicine, etc., to
guarantee the right to health.
More recent analyses of the traditional distinction between civil and
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights have
demonstrated the many flaws in the rationale ordinarily employed to
justify a differential treatment for these different classes of rights."3 The
most convincing critique of the generational distinction focuses on the
elements of negative liberty and positive action inherent in rights from
both generations. According to numerous scholarly views synthesized by
Victor Abramovich and Christian Courtis, the distinction is untenable
when subjected to closer examination, given that civil and political rights
contain elements that require positive action by the state, while
economic, social, and cultural rights contain elements that require the
state to abstain from actions that violates these rights."4 As they write,
Even those rights that appear to entail what may be characterized as a
"negative obligation," that is, those that entail restrictions on the
State's activities in order not to interfere with individual liberties-for
113. See e.g., THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Fons
Coomans & Fried van Hoof, eds. 1995) (series of essays in defense of the justiciability of the rights to
education, housing, health and food); INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Los DERECHOS
ECON6MICos, SOCIALES Y CULTURALES: UN DESAFfO IMPOSTERGABLE (San Jose, Costa Rica 1999)

(collection of articles on the advance of economic, social, and cultural rights in Argentina, the
Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Nicaragua).
114. Victor Abramovich & Christian Courtis, Hacia la exigibilidad de los derechos econ6micos,

sociales y culturales. Estdndares internacionalesy criteriosde aplicacidn ante los tribunales locales, in
LA

APLICACI6N D
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283-350 (Martin Abregdi
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example, prohibitions against arbitrary detention, censorship of the
press through prior restraint, or the violation of correspondence and
private documents-also entail substantial activity on the part of the
State. The State must guarantee that non-State actors do not interfere
with individual freedoms, the exercise of which necessitates activity by
police, public security and defense forces, and the judiciary. Obviously,
5
carrying out these functions entails positive obligations."

At the same time, at the other extreme, one finds that inherent in
economic, social, and cultural rights, is:
[t]he concomitant existence of obligations to refrain from action: the
right to health entails the State's obligation not to harm an individual's
health; the right to education presumes the obligation not to worsen
education; the right to cultural preservation implies the obligation not
to destroy cultural patrimony.., many of the legal actions giving rise
to judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights are
directed at correcting activities by the State that violate its obligation
not to act.

Beginning with this realization, Abramovich and Courtis set out the
basic components of rights, ranging from negative liberty, at one
extreme, to provision of goods and services directly by the state at the
other. In this scheme, rights-both civil and political and economic,
social, and cultural-include, in differing degrees, these varying
elements.
Abramovich and Courtis demonstrate that economic, social, and
cultural rights demand not only affirmative actions to guarantee and
promote, but also require that the state respect and protect."7 Citing the
example of the right to food, the authors argue that states must not:
expropriate lands from a community whose sustenance depends
principally or entirely upon access to that resource, without taking
appropriate alternative measures. The State's obligation to protect
rights includes the obligation to ensure that individuals are not
deprived-for example, by the actions of third parties, such as
115. Id. at 286 (authors' translation). The original Spanish text reads:

Aun aquellos derechos que parecen ajustarse mAs ficilmente a la caracterizaci6n de
'obligaci6n negativa', es decir, los que requieren una limitaci6n en la actividad del Estado a
fin de no interferir ]a libertad de los particulares-por ejemplo, ]a prohibici6n de detenci6n
arbitraria, la prohibici6n del establecimiento de censura previa a la prensa, o bien la
prohibici6n de violar la correspondencia y los papeles privados-, conllevan una intensa
actividad estatal destinada a que otros particulares no interfieran esa libertad, de modo tal
que la contracara del ejercicio de estos derechos esti dada por el cumplimiento de
funciones de policia, seguridad, defensa y justicia por parte del Estado. Evidentemente, el
cumplimeiento de estas funciones reclama obligaciones positivas.
116. Id. at 287 (authors' translation). The original Spanish text reads:
[Ila existencia concomitante de obligaciones de no hacer: el derecho a ]a salud conlleva la
obligaci6n estatal de no dafiar la salud; el derecho a la educaci6n supone la obligaci6n de no
empeorar la educaci6n; el derecho a la preservaci6n del patrimonio cultural implica la
obligaci6n de no destruir el patrimonio cultural.... muchas de las acciones legales
tendentes a la aplicaci6n judicial de los derechos econ6micos, sociales y culturales se dirigen
a corregir la actividad estatal cuando dsta incumple con obligaciones de no hacer.
117. Id.
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dominant economic groups-of the basic resources such as access to
land, water, or the labor market, which are necessary to satisfy their
need for food. "8
In light of the above, it is clear that a new analytical framework is
required to ensure the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights.
Indeed, a study of cases from the European and universal (i.e., United
Nations) human rights systems, as well as recent decisions issued by the
Inter-American Commission and Court, suggests several approaches for
expanding the protection afforded to economic, social, and cultural
rights.
Two approaches that have emerged in the European, universal, and,
increasingly, Inter-American contexts-and which we believe are the
most promising in terms of achieving real-world results-are based on
expansive interpretations of well-established rights. As we discuss below,
the first approach entails an analysis of economic, social, and cultural
rights in the context of a general principle of non-discrimination. In the
second approach, economic, social, and cultural "elements" of rights
traditionally understood as civil and political are considered integral
components of these rights, such that the state's failure to respect them
may result in violations of applicable human rights instruments.
A.

THE NON-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE

Article 1 of the American Convention, which sets forth states'
general obligations establishes that:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discriminationfor reasons of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
economic status, birth, or any other social condition."9

Neither the Commission nor the Court has referred explicitly to the
non-discrimination element of Article 1 in finding a violation of
economic, social, or cultural rights. Yet the Court recently held, in
Advisory Opinion OC-i8,' ° relating to the rights of migrant workers in
the Americas, that the principles of non-discrimination precluded states
from denying workers fundamental rights on the basis of their migratory
i8. Id. (authors' translation). The original Spanish text reads:
o
expropiar tierras a una poblaci6n para lacual el acceso a ese recurso constituye la linica
principal forma de asegurar su alimentaci6n, salvo que se adopten medidas alternativas
apropiadas.
La obligaci6n estatal de proteger el derecho incluye el deber de prevenir que las personas
resulten de una u otra manera privadas de sus recursos b~sicos para satisfacer sus
necesidades de alimentaci6n, por otras personas, por ejemplo grupos econ6micos
dominantes, en aspectos diversos como acceso a latierra, al agua, al mercado, al trabajo.
119. Am. Cony. H.R., supra note i2,art. i(I) (emphasis added).
120. OC-i8 Ad. Op., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (2003).
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status.' 2 ' The Court held that "the migratory status of a person cannot
constitute a justification to deprive him of the enjoyment and exercise of
human rights, including those of a labor-related nature .... The Court
went so far as to hold that non-discrimination and equal protection
principles have attained the status of jus cogens norms (i.e., peremptory
norms of international law based on universal consensus regarding
certain elemental values that states cannot legitimately oppose through
domestic legislation).
The Court's reasoning in OC-i8 reflects two separate theoretical
bases for its expansion of economic, social, and cultural rights. The first
involves increased protection for certain labor rights directly by
recognizing their fundamental and inalienable nature, and which thus
entails stricter duties on the part of states. 23' The second basis for
expanding these rights is indirect. This basis works through application of
the non-discrimination principle to ensure that these rights are
guaranteed with respect to all classes of workers, including
undocumented migrants. While the Court's holding in OC-I8-as in all
advisory opinions-is intended to resolve abstract questions of law and
does not determine any concrete violations, it suggests that given the
right factual circumstances, the Court may be disposed to expand
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights in both of these ways.'24
Prior to its decision in OC-i8, the Court had applied the nondiscrimination principle in a less explicit fashion in promoting certain
economic, social, and cultural rights. In OC-ii, the Court considered
whether the indigence of a petitioner could constitute legitimate grounds
for an exception to the rule that domestic remedies must be exhausted
before seeking recourse to the Commission and concluded that:
If a person who is seeking the protection of the law in order to assert
rights which the Convention guarantees finds that his economic status

121.

Id.

Id. para. 173(8).
123. Support for the direct justiciability of labor rights can be found in Article 8(a) of the San
Salvador Protocol, which specifically provides for the litigation of labor-related claims. See supra note
122.

7.
124. The Court's extension of the principle of jus cogens to protect the labor rights of migrant
workers raises some concerns. In particular, the Court's willingness to apply broadly a previously
limited doctrine of international law may suggest that the Court is more interested in establishing
novel and forward-looking precedent than in adjudicating cases in a way likely to effectuate real-world
change. Because OC-i8 involved the request for an advisory opinion rather than a contentious matter,
no particular state is obligated to implement its terms in the short run. This fact renders assessment of
its effectiveness more difficult. Yet, given its sweeping determinations, and the prevalence of state
abuse of migrant labor rights in the Americas (See Brief Amici Curiae of the Harvard Immigration
and Refugee Clinic, Student Working Group on Human Rights in the Americas of Harvard and
Boston College Law Schools, & Global Justice Center, Jan. 11, 2003, available at
http://www.global.org.br), there is every reason to suspect that OAS member states will fail to comply
with the opinion expressed in OC-i8.
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(in this case, his indigency), prevents him from so doing because he
cannot afford either the necessary legal counsel or the costs of the
proceedings, that person is being discriminated against by reason of his
economic status and, hence, is not receiving equal protection before
the law.
[P]rotection of the law consists, fundamentally, of the remedies the law
provides for the protection of the rights guaranteed by the
Convention.' 5
While the Court stopped short of declaring that states have an
affirmative duty to provide free legal services to indigent individuals, it
found that the non-provision of such services could give rise to a
violation of the Convention's fair trial guarantees. In this way, the Court
used a non-discrimination rationale to expand state responsibility beyond
the traditional realm of upholding "negative liberties."
For its part, the Inter-American Commission effectively advanced
the economic, social, and cultural rights of women by application of the
anti-discrimination principles in Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v.
Guatemala.16 In that case, the Commission considered provisions of the
Guatemalan Civil Code that relate to the roles of men and women within
the family. The Commission found that provisions that limited the rights
of married women by according their husbands the right to determine
whether or not their spouses could work outside the home violated
article 17(4) of the Convention (rights of the family), in conjunction with
article I6(1) of the Convention on the 2Elimination
of all forms of
7
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Precedent for the Inter-American Court's use of the nondiscrimination principle can be found in both the European and universal
human rights contexts. In fact, for two decades the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR" or the "European Court") has consistently and
explicitly referred to the European Convention's non-discrimination
provisions in decisions that have expanded protection for economic,
social, and cultural rights. Article 14 of the European Convention reads:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or

125. Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(l), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b)
American Convention on Human Rights), OC-ii Ad. Op., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 22-23
(1990).
126. Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
4/oi, OEA/ser. L./V./II.iii, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
127. This case illustrates the tendency of the Commission to apply norms established in universal
treaties. A detailed examination of the ways in which these norms may be used to advance respect for
human rights in general terms is beyond the scope of this article. We do, however, cite a few of the
most important precedents for the promotion of economic, social, and cultural rights.
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other status.
The European Court has found violations of this Article in several
cases with important economic, social, and cultural elements. For
example, in Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. The United
Kingdom,"9 petitioners (non-native, permanent residents of the United
Kingdom) questioned distinctions in British immigration law that
effectively denied the right of entry to their male spouses in
circumstances in which female spouses would have been granted
residence. Each of the petitioners lawfully resided in the United
Kingdom and had sought permission for her husband to join her in
residence. In each case, such permission was denied by immigration
authorities. The petitioners argued that the refusal to grant residence to
their male spouses in circumstances in which females spouses of male
applicants would have been granted violated, inter alia, Article 14 of the
Convention. The Court upheld their claim.
Critical to the Court's analysis was the evaluation of economic
rights. The United Kingdom argued that it could rationally and
legitimately distinguish between female and male spouses because the
latter were far more likely to seek employment than female spouses. The
government presented evidence concerning the then-current economic
crisis and level of unemployment in the United Kingdom, as well as
support for the position that male immigrants were more likely to seek
work than female immigrants. While the Abdulaziz Court analyzed the
issues before it in the context of family rights (Article 8) and the
prohibition of discrimination (Article 4), it is clear that the decision has
implications for fundamental economic rights, such as the right to seek
employment.
In Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland,'30 the European Court went
further in establishing the application of the principle of nondiscrimination to economic, social, and cultural rights. In that case, the
Court reviewed a Swiss court's denial of unemployment benefits to a
married woman with a two-year old child on the theory that she was
unlikely to seek work outside her home. Had she been a childless man,
the Swiss court would presumably have recognized the right to
unemployment benefits. The European Court held that the decision
violated the non-discrimination clause of Article 14 of the European
Convention. As in Abdulaziz, the Court explicitly held that economic
rights that would not otherwise be protected by the Convention would be
guaranteed against discriminatory application.
Several decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
128. Eur. Cony. on H.R., art. 14.

Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (8985).
130. Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 263 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
129.
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the body charged with interpreting and applying the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, support the doctrine of the
European Court of Human Rights in applying the principle of nondiscrimination to economic, social, and cultural rights even when these
are not the subject of protection on their own. In Zwaan de Vries v. The
Netherlands, the Committee issued a ruling extending the right to nondiscrimination to economic rights otherwise clearly beyond the scope of
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. 3' In Zwaan de Vries, the
Committee considered legislation that required married women seeking
unemployment compensation to show that their income had been the
primary source of income for their families. Neither married men, nor
single men or women were required to make such a showing. In rejecting
the undue burden on married women, the Human Rights Committee
wrote:
Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit
discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect
to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not,
for example, require any State to enact legislation to provide for social
security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a
State's sovereign power,
then such legislation must comply with article
3
26 of the Covenant.' '
The Zwaan de Vries holding allowed the Human Rights Committee
to establish with crystal clarity the expansive nature of the principle of
non-discrimination. Whatever the economic, social, or cultural rightsocial security, in these cases, or any other benefit or program that a state
may provide-it may never be provided in a discriminatory fashion
under the principles of international human rights law. As we consider
below, petitioners may achieve significant results by defining
discrimination expansively, as well as by finding applications of this
principle to an increasing range of state activity.
B.

THE "ELEMENTS" APPROACH

In a number of recent decisions, the Inter-American Court and
Commission- as well as individual judges in separate opinions-have
construed classic civil and political rights expansively so as to include
economic, social or cultural elements. The first example of this approach
by the Court was in the Baena Ricardo case, in which the Panamanian
government summarily dismissed 270 employees in retaliation for their
participation in a demonstration.'33 While the Court considered violations
of Convention articles traditionally associated with civil and political

131. Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
40 (A/42/4o), at i6o (1987).
132. Id. para. 12.4.
133. Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72 (2001).
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rights,'3 4 its discussion of the right to due process included an
acknowledgment of the way in which violations of this right may have
serious economic, social, and cultural implications.
In support of its holding in favor of the dismissed workers, the Court
made specific reference to the severe social and economic consequences
of the State's violation of due process:
The Court is not oblivious to the fact that the dismissals, made without
the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention, had serious social and
economic consequences for the persons dismissed and their relatives
and dependants, such as the loss of income and a reduction of the
living pattern. There is no doubt that, in applying a sanction with such
serious consequences, the State should have ensured to the worker a
due process with the guarantees provided for in the American
Convention."'
The Court's holding in Baena Ricardo indicates its willingness to
consider the economic and social consequences of violations of civil and
political rights. Though the Court did not explicitly construe these
consequences as "elements" of rights established in the Conventionthough it would do that in later cases, as we shall see-the mere
recognition that such consequences were relevant to the Court's holding
was an important first
step to expanding protection of economic, social,
6
and cultural rights.,
In Five Pensioners v. Peru'37 the Court took a step further in
examining economic, social, and cultural rights in the context of a
petition alleging the violation of civil and political rights. In Five
Pensioners, a group of retirees alleged that Peru had arbitrarily and
drastically reduced pension payments to which they were entitled.
Petitioners argued their case on two separate grounds: first, that the
State's action constituted a violation of Article 21 of the Convention
(right to private property-a classic civil and political right), and, second,
that it constituted a violation of Article 26 of the Convention (relating to
state obligations to advance economic, social, and cultural rights).
In a significant and revealing decision, the Court upheld the
Commission's claims based on Article 21 but refused to adjudicate its
claims based on Article 26. The Court held the right to social security

134. Id. para. i.

The Commission submitted the case in order for the Court to decide whether or not
Panama had violated Articles i(i) (Obligation to Respect Rights); 2 (Domestic Legal
Effects); 8 (Right to a Fair Trial); 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws); io (Right to
Compensation); i5 (Right of Assembly); I6 (Freedom of Association); [and] 25 (Right to
Judicial Protection) ... of the Convention.
135. Id. para. 134.
136. It is worth noting that Panama has failed to comply fully with the Court's orders and has
recently challenged the Court's jurisdiction to monitor compliance with the judgment. See id.
137. "Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (2003).
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payments to be a property right, and therefore fully protected by the
guarantees of Article 21. It based this holding on "a progressively
developing interpretation of international instruments that protect
human rights."'' 3 The Court's broad construction of property rights is an
example of how it may incrementally expand economic, social, and
cultural rights through an expansive interpretation of substantive rights
traditionally understood as civil and political.
We will discuss the Court's terse holding with respect to the
Commission's Article 26 claim in a later section, but note here our view
that the Court's refusal to adjudicate the claim is evidence that Article 26
is generally a weak tool for enforcing economic, social, and cultural
rights.
The Five Pensioners case was not the first time the Court had
addressed economic, social, and cultural imperatives through an
expansive view of property rights. In August of 2001, the Court issued a
landmark decision in the matter of The Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous
Community of Awas Tingni v. The Republic of Nicaragua.39' In that case,
the Court addressed the scope of property rights under Article 21 in the
context of a claim by an indigenous community seeking to assert
collective property rights against the Nicaraguan government.
Noting that human rights treaties are living instruments subject to
change over time, the Court concluded that:
Through an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments
for the protection of human rights, taking into account applicable
norms of interpretation and pursuant to article 29 (b) of the
Convention -which precludes a restrictive interpretation of rights-, it

is the opinion of this Court that article 21 of the Convention protects
the right to property in a sense which includes, among others, the rights
of members of the indigenous communities within the framework of
communal property, which is also recognized by the Constitution of
Nicaragua. P4
The Court is currently considering a second case involving
41
indigenous rights, Yakye Axa v. Paraguay.'
Petitioners in that case
allege, among other claims, that the State failed to provide the
community with adequate assistance during the processing of their
territorial claims. This failure, they argue, rendered the community's
situation with respect to food security, medical care, and sanitation
extremely precarious, and thus constituted a violation of Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (rights of

138. Id.
139. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (200).
140. Id. para. 148.
141. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People, Paraguay, Case No. 12.313,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 2/02, OEA/ser. L/V./II. 117,
doc. i rev. 1 (2002).
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minorities) as well as of several articles of the International Labor
Organization Convention 169 concerning tribal and indigenous peoples.
While the Court's analysis of this claim remains to be seen, the case
presents an opportunity for it to determine whether the State has an
affirmative obligation to provide economic assistance to the community
pending procedures to formalize its territorial claim.
The Court's holdings in Baena Ricardo, Five Pensioners, and Awas
Tingni resonate with a quarter century of jurisprudence of the European
Court. In 1979 the Court issued its judgment in Airey v. Ireland,'42 a case
involving an Irish woman, Johanna Airey, who had unsuccessfully sought
to conclude a separation agreement from her husband. Under Irish law,
while divorce was not available at the time of the case, the High Court
could issue a decree relieving spouses from the duty to cohabitate. The
legal costs involved in obtaining such a decree varied from 500-700
pounds when not contested, and 8o0-1200 pounds when contested. The

Court found that Ms. Airey lacked the means to pay these fees. Ireland
did not provide free legal aid to persons like Ms. Airey seeking such
judicial decrees. The petitioner alleged a series of violations of the
European Convention on Human Rights, in particular, the right to legal
assistance (Article 6), the right to family life (Article 8), the right to an
effective remedy (Article 13), and the right to be free from
discrimination (Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6 on right to legal
assistance). While the Court did not reach the question of nondiscrimination (as the Inter-American Court would later do with respect
to similar issues in OC-I I), it responded to Ireland's claim that it had no
duty under the European Convention to provide legal aid (an economic
right), with the following observations:
The Court is aware that the further realisation of social and economic
rights is largely dependent on the situation-notably financialreigning in the State in question. On the other hand, the Convention
... is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as
regards those areas with which it deals.... Whilst the Convention sets
forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have
implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore
considers, like the Commission, that the mere fact that an
interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of social
and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an
interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that sphere
from the field covered by the Convention.' 3
Thus, despite the Court's recognition that the Convention protected
"essentially civil and political rights," it imposed duties of an economic
nature on the Irish government and recognized what, in practice, was an
economic demand of Ms. Airey.
142. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
143. Id. para. 26.
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The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, in its sixth
official comment, supported the "elements" approach in the context of
the right to life.'" In that comment, the Committee defended this
interpretation of the right to life:
[T]he Committee has noted that the right to life has been too often
narrowly interpreted. The expression "inherent right to life" cannot
properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of
this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this
connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for
States parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality
and to increase life expectancy, especially
in adopting measures to
45
eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.
This expansive view of the right to life was first expressed in the
Inter-American context by Judges Canqado Trindade and Abreu Morelli
in their concurring opinion in the Villagran Morales 6 case. In that case,
the two judges found that "the arbitrary deprivation of life is not
limited.., to the illicit act of homicide; it extends itself likewise to the
deprivation of the right to live with dignity,"' 47 As Judge Canqado
Trindade wrote, "[t]his outlook conceptualizes the right to life as
belonging, at the same time, to the domain of civil and political rights, as
well as economic, social, and cultural rights, thus illustrating the
interrelation and indivisibility of all human rights."'48
The Court as a whole echoed this analysis in Advisory Opinion OCI7," 9 when it construed the Convention's right to life provision
expansively as applied to children:
Regarding conditions for care of children, the right to life that is
enshrined in Article 4 of the American Convention does not only
involve the prohibitions set forth in that provision, but also the
obligation to provide the measures required for life to develop under
decent conditions.' 50
On the basis of this reasoning, the Court concluded that
respect for life, regarding children, encompasses not only prohibitions,
including that of arbitrarily depriving a person of this right, as set forth
in Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, but also
the obligation to adopt the measures required for children's existence

144. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights

Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess., Gen. cmt. 6, art. 6, para. 6, U.N. doc.
HRI/GEN/i/Rev.i (1994).
145. Id. para. 5.

146. Villagrin-Morales v. Guatemala ("Street Children" Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63
(1999).
147. Id. para. 4 (Canqado Trindade, J. & Abreu-Burelli, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Cangado Trindade, J. & Abreu-Burelli, J., concurring).
149. OC-17 Ad. Op., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (2002).
I5O. Id. para. 80 (citing Villagrdn-Morales v. Guatemala ("Street Children" Case), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 63 (i999)).
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to develop under decent conditions; 5 '
and that
true and full protection of children entails their broad enjoyment of all
their rights, including their economic, social, and cultural rights,
embodied in various international instruments. The States Parties to
to take positive
international human rights treaties have the obligation
5 2
steps to ensure protection of all rights of children.
In Children's Rehabilitation v. Paraguay,5 ' a number of minors in
state custody suffered injuries resulting from the unsanitary and
inhumane conditions that prevailed in the institution in which they were
interned. In this recent case, the Court affirmed that both the right to life
and the right to physical integrity contain economic, social, and cultural
elements, particularly with respect to children."'
C.

CONTRAST: THE DIRECT APPROACH

Both of the indirect approaches discussed above for advancing
economic, social, and cultural rights-by applying a non-discrimination
principle, or by seeking to incorporate economic, social, and cultural
elements within the scope of justiciable civil and political rights-may be
contrasted with a direct approach, in which advocates allege violations of
provisions of human rights instruments that specifically refer to
economic, social, and cultural rights.' 5 To date, the direct approach has
met with little success for a variety of theoretical, practical, and political
reasons that we discuss throughout this Article. Though petitioners
before the Court have claimed violations of Article 26-the only
Convention article specifically referring to economic, social, and cultural
rights-in several recent cases,' 56 the Court has refused consistently to
adjudicate these claims.
In Five Pensioners, the Court reasoned that economic, social, and
cultural rights have both an individual and a collective dimension, and
that any analysis of state compliance with its obligation to undertake
progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights must
consider:
the growing coverage of economic, social and cultural rights in general,
and of the right to social security and to a pension in particular, of the
entire population bearing in mind the imperatives of social equity, and

I5 . Id. para. 137(7).
152. Id. para. 137(8). See also Children's Rehabilitation vs. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 112 para. 158 (2004).
153. Children's Rehabilitation v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112 (2004).
154. Id. para. 149.

155. Such provisions include Article 26 of the American Convention, various provisions of the
American Declaration, and the totality of the San Salvador Protocol.
156. "Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (2003); Children's
Rehabilitation v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112 (2004).
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not in function of the circumstances of a very limited group of
pensioners, who do not necessarily represent the prevailing situation."'
The Court's brief analysis leaves no doubt as to its intention to limit
the scope of Article 26 as a basis for the protection of individual
economic, social, and cultural rights. In fact, the Court seems to have
precluded consideration of Article 26 violations in any contentious case.
On the one hand, its jurisprudence clearly establishes that .it is competent
to hear contentious cases only where individual victims or, at most,
discrete, clearly identifiable groups of victims have been injured. I 8 On
the other hand, it appears, in Five Pensioners,to be saying that Article 26
violations can be determined only with respect to the state's population
as a whole.
59
the Court again declined
In Children's Rehabilitation v. Paraguay,'
'6°
to adjudicate the Article 26 claims. This time, the Court merely found
that resolution of the Article 26 claims was unnecessary in light of its
consideration of the economic, social, and cultural elements inherent in
the claims based on Articles 4 (the right to life). and 5 (the right to
physical integrity).' 6 '
As we will discuss in detail in the following section, petitioners in
several cases pending in the Inter-American system have taken the direct
approach, alleging violations of Article 26 of the Convention, of the San
Salvador Protocol, or of provisions of the American Declaration that
deal with economic, social, and cultural rights. It remains to be seen how
the Commission and Court will address these claims in.light of the
emerging trend in favor of indirect adjudication.
IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
At this writing, both the Commission and the Court have before
them several petitions seeking determinations regarding abuses of
economic, social, and cultural rights in which to develop its treatment of
these issues. In these cases, the technique most frequently employed by
petitioners is the presentation of "hybrid" petitions, which present
violations of both civil and political and economic, social, and cultural
rights. The alleged violation of the civil or political right or rights
guarantees initial access to the Inter-American system and facilitates the
157. Id. para. 147.
158. See OC-I4 Ad. Op., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 49 (1994). ("The contentious
jurisdiction of the Court is intended to protect the rights and freedoms of specific individuals, not to

resolve abstract questions.").
159. Children's Rehabilitation v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. II2 (2004).
16o. In Five Pensioners, the Commission brought the Article 26 claim. In Children'sRehabilitation,
the Commission declined to allege violations under that Article, but the representatives of the victims
did choose to bring the claim. This suggests to us that the Commission may have retreated from its

earlier, more aggressive posture.
161. Children's Rehabilitation v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, para. 225 (2004).

December

2004]

LESS AS MORE

consideration of the alleged violations of economic, social, and cultural
"elements" of these rights.
In Men~ndez, Caride et al. v. Argentina,62 a case pending before the
Commission that presents similar claims to those adjudicated in Five
Pensioners,63 a group of retirees whose pensions were discontinued
allege the violation of rights enshrined in the American Convention
(Articles 8 (judicial guarantees), 21 (property), 24 (equal protection) and
25 (effective remedy)), as well as of rights recognized in the American
Declaration (Article XI (to the preservation of health and well-being)
and Articles XVI, XXXV and XXXVII (to social security, in relation to
the obligation to work and contribute to social security)).
The petitioners assert that the right to property includes the right to
receive a dignified pension, i.e., that one's lifetime of work creates
property that cannot be unduly seized by the state. The petition
exemplifies both the "elements" approach, in that it seeks to recognize
the right to receive a pension (an economic right) as a component of the
right to private property, and the direct approach, in that it asserts
specific economic, social, and cultural rights recognized in the
Declaration but not contained in the Convention. The Court upheld the
Convention-based position in Five Pensioners, in which domestic law
expressly created an "acquired right" to certain social security payments,
but it remains to be seen whether the Commission will reach the same
result in Men~ndez, where petitioners do not allege the existence or
violation of any such right expressly created under domestic law.
In Odir Miranda v. El Salvador, 64 petitioners similarly take an
"elements" approach, asserting that the right to life should be construed
broadly to include questions of health, and that states parties to the
American Declaration and the San Salvador Protocol have the
affirmative duty to guarantee the right to health as provided for in these
two instruments.
Odir Miranda learned that he was HIV-positive in 1997 after being
hospitalized at the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (Instituto de
Seguridad Social-ISSS). After his health improved markedly following
a course of anti-retroviral therapy, Miranda petitioned the ISSS to
purchase and administer the elements of the anti-retroviral treatment.
After the ISSS denied his petition and domestic recourse proved
inadequate, Miranda submitted a petition to the Inter-American
Commission seeking to compel the State to provide the treatment.

162. Mendndez v. Argentina, Case No. 11.670, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 03/oi, OEA/ser.
L./V./IIs i I,doc. 20 rev. (2001).
163. "Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (20o3).
164. Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez v. El Salvador, Case 12.249, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/Ol,
OEAISer.L/V/II.I I I, doc. 20 rev. (2000).
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In the case pending before the Commission, Miranda and other
alleged victims contend that El Salvador is responsible for the violation
of the rights to life (Article 4), humane treatment (Article 5), equal
protection before the law (Article 24), judicial protection (Article 25),
and economic, social, and cultural rights (Article 26) under the American
Convention. In addition, the petitioners allege violation of Article io of
the San Salvador Protocol and Article XI of the American Declaration.
Petitioners assert that
the right to life encompasses much more than not dying as a result of
action or negligence attributable to the State, in accordance with the
rules of international law. The right to life, in that broader sense,
presupposes, inter alia, that65a person lives under conditions that are
conducive to his well being.
The petitioners maintained that the State's failure to provide antiretroviral treatment violated Article io of the San Salvador Protocol and
Article XI of the American Declaration, which guarantee the right to
health, and that these instruments, in conjunction with the provisions of
Article 26 of the American Convention (progressive development of
economic, social, and cultural rights), give rise to an "immediate legal
obligation." They argue that the State must "conduct all acts ...
necessary to improve health, leading to the highest level of physical,
mental, and social well being through the use of modern advances and
scientific medical discoveries."6
The Commission found the case admissible 6' but specifically stated
that it would not determine El Salvador's responsibility under Article Io
of the San Salvador Protocol, construing Article 19(6) of that instrument
to limit the Commission's competence
to determinations on alleged
68
violations of Articles 8(a) and 13 only.
The Commission's position with respect to violations of Article 26
was less clear. The Commission appeared to consider these allegations
on a similar footing to those involving the violation of certain civil and
political rights.' 69 Since the Commission's decision, however, the Court
has held, in the Five Pensioners7 ' case, that it would not adjudicate
alleged violations of Article 26 in individual cases. In light of the Court's
holding, it is unlikely that the Commission will sustain the petitioner's
allegations in this regard.
165. Id. para. 24.
166. Id. para. 26.
167. Id. para. 49(I).
168. As discussed above, the San Salvador Protocol specifically allows for individual complaints to
be brought under articles 8(a) and 13 (pertaining to certain labor rights and the right to education).
169. "In the view of the Inter-American Commission, these allegations must be examined during
the phase related to the merits of the case, in order to determine whether the facts reported violated
articles 2, 24, 25 and 26 of the American Convention." Id. para. 45.
170. "Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (2o03).
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In the meantime, Odir Miranda and his case have gained
international renown among HIV/AIDS activists, and progress has been
made towards the State's fulfillment of his demands. In February of 2000,
the Commission granted precautionary measures on behalf of Odir
Miranda and twenty-six other members of the Asociaci6n Atlacatl, in
which it urged the State of El Salvador to provide them with treatment
and antiretroviral drugs, as well as hospital, pharmacological, and
nutritional care.'7 ' In June of 2000, the Board of Directors of the ISSS
authorized the procurement of the antiretroviral therapy for persons who
are HIV-positive or have AIDS, and the ISSS began providing
treatment.' 72 It is impossible to say whether the State would have

implemented the Commission's request in the absence of the concerted
efforts by HIV/AIDS activists, or, conversely, whether the State would
have heeded the activists' demands in the absence of a request by the
Commission. What this case illustrates is the potential success of an
integrated strategy that includes individual case litigation and also
measures to raise grassroots support for a particular issue.
As we illustrated in Part III, recent decisions affirm that economic,
social, and cultural rights are indivisible from civil and political
guarantees. Further, the Court is open to construing both substantive and
procedural provisions liberally, in such a way as to protect economic,
social, and cultural rights through implementation of norms traditionally
understood as guaranteeing civil and political rights. These decisions also
suggest a reluctance to enforce economic, social, and cultural rights
through the application of provisions that clearly establish such rights,
but that provide no definite grounds for state responsibility, or that fail
to establish a mechanism for enforcement, such as Article 26 of the
Convention, or the majority of the San Salvador Protocol (with the
exception of Articles 8(a) and I3). In light of these decisions and of realworld progress that has been made on these issues, we can construct a
goal-oriented strategy for future development that effectively utilizes the
tools available in the Inter-American system. Below, we analyze the
various options available to advocates, weighing the pros and cons of
each.
26: A SUSPECT OPTION
One avenue by which economic, social, and cultural rights may be
promoted through the case law of the Inter-American system is through
an expansive interpretation of Article 26 of the American Convention
Although the Commission has not precluded the possibility of finding
states responsible for violations of Article 26, the Court's holding in Five
A.

EXPANSION OF ARTICLE

171. See Annual Report 2oo0,
172.

Id.

Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.iii, doc. 20 rev. I6 (2001).
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Pensioners substantially limits the extent to which either body can
determine, in individual cases, state responsibility for failure to develop
economic, social, and cultural rights progressively.
There can be little doubt that a broad interpretation of Article 26
along the lines requested would be the easiest formula for incorporating
economic, social, and cultural rights in the case law of the InterAmerican system. However, the Commission should, for a number of
reasons, proceed with great caution should it pursue this line of legal
reasoning.
First is the fact that Article 26 enumerates no specific rights
enforceable on an individual basis.'73 In fact, the travaux preparatoires
leading up to the final draft of the Convention suggest that there was
some debate about whether the instrument should include protection for
economic, social, and cultural rights at all.' 74 The failure to provide
specific protection for these rights appears to be not an oversight, but
rather a conscious effort to weaken state obligations in this respect.'75
Indeed, the Commission itself has noted that Article 26 tends to view
"economic, social, and cultural rights as objectives of development and
not as values in themselves."' I6
Second, to the extent one may nonetheless argue that Article 26 is
ambiguous as to the creation of enforceable rights, the OAS appears to
have resolved these doubts when it drafted and adopted the San
Salvador Protocol. Unlike Article 26 of the Convention, the San
Salvador Protocol, which specifically addresses the enforceability of
economic, social, and cultural rights in the Americas, clearly establishes
the circumstances in which a violation may be considered in a petition to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Article i9 states that
violation of articles 8(a) and 13 give rise to the right of individual petition
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.'77 As we have

173. See Matthew Craven; Economic, Social, and CulturalRights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 299 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone, eds. 1998).
174- See id. at 297-301.

175. See id. at 297. Craven notes that "Although each of the draft Conventions presented by the
American Committee of Jurists, by Panama, and by Chile, gave extensive recognition to economic,
social and cultural rights... the final 'working draft' presented by the inter-American Commission
virtually excluded all reference to them.".Id. (internal citations omitted).
176. Annual Report 1983-84, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. V(II) para. 4, OEA/ser. LJV.II.6 3 , doc. to
(1984).
177. Article 19(6) of the San Salvador Protocol states:
Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph a) of Article 8 and in Article 13
are violated by action directly attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise,
through participation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when
applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to application of the system of
individual petitions governed by Article 44 through 51 and 6i through 69 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.
Protocolof San Salvador, supranote 7,art. i9(6).
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noted, the clear implication of that article is that violations of the other
articles of the San Salvador Protocol do not give rise to the right of
individual petition to the Inter-American Commission.
The Inter-American Commission itself echoed this understanding of
Article I9 of the San Salvador Protocol in its May 2001 revision of its
Rules of Procedure. "8 Article 23 of those Rules states:
Any person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally
recognized in one or more of the member states of the OAS may
submit petitions to the Commission, on their own behalf or on behalf
of third persons, concerning alleged violations of a human right
recognized in, as the case may be, the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human
Rights, the Additional Protocol in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty, the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the InterAmerican Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and/or the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, in accordance with their
respective provisions, the Statute of the Commission, and these Rules
of Procedure.7
The text on "their respective provisions" refers to Articles 8(a) and
13 of the Additional Protocol in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights '8° and Article 7 of the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women,' 8'
each of which limits access to the Commission to the violation of certain
rights.
The Court, unlike the Commission, exercises the luxury of reviewing
each case over a period of months. That body is conscious of the import
of its sentences both as the final word within the Inter-American system
(i.e., the role of structuring jurisprudence for the Commission) and as
measures of vast political significance. This fact, among others, has made
the Court somewhat more cautious in establishing new precedents.
Notwithstanding its interest in advancing the promotion of economic,
social, and cultural rights, the Commission, in construing Article 26 of
the American Convention, must be careful not to establish case law that
will fail to survive the scrutiny of the Court.
B.

THE WISER PATH: RESTRAINED DEVELOPMENT OF PRECEDENT IN
CONJUNCTION WITH MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES

For a number of practical,

political,

and historical

reasons,

178. Regulations of the Inter-Am. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., available at http://wwwi.umn.edu/
humanrts/oasinstr/iachrregulations.htmL
179. Id. art. 23 (emphasis added).
18o. Protocolof San Salvador,supra note 7.
181. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
Against Women, entered into force Mar. 5, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
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governments tend to support the view that economic, social, and cultural
rights should not be afforded the same protection given to civil and
political rights. To the extent that advocates seek to achieve realistically
enforceable Court sentences on economic, social, and cultural rights,
they should be attentive to governmental resistance to the enforcement
of such rights. A sentence imposing obligations on governments based
exclusively on a broad interpretation of Article 26 and its use as a vehicle
to render other treaty obligations immediately justiciable may be
doomed to failure and is likely to provoke extreme reactions from the
member states of the OAS.
I. General Principle: Towards an Evolutionary Interpretationof
Human Rights
Expansion of human rights norms in the Inter-American system will
remain on relatively firm ground to the extent that it may be justified as
legitimate construction of evolving norms of international human rights
law. On at least three occasions, a majority of the Inter-American Court
has invoked "evolutionary" interpretation as the justification of
expanding the reach of existing human rights norms. In the Awas Tingni
case, the Court held that human rights evolve, and that elements not
considered present within given rights at their drafting may be found to
be present in later interpretations."" Similarly, as Judge Canqado
Trindade wrote in his concurring opinion in the Villagrdn Morales case,
the Court had already found,
in its i6th Advisory Opinion, on The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of

Law (I999), that the interpretation of an international instrument of
protection ought to 'accompany the evolution of times and the presentday conditions of life', and that such evolutive interpretation, in
accordance with the general rules of interpretation of treaties, has
contributed decisively to the advances of the International Law of
Human Rights.' s'
Indeed, in OC-16, the Court wrote:
That evolutive interpretation is consistent with the general rules of
treaty interpretation established in the 1969 Vienna Convention. Both
this Court... and the European Court of Human Rights... have held
that human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation
must consider the changes over time and present-day conditions.18
Thus, the Court has established a clear line of precedent regarding
182. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
79, para. r47 (2ooi) (applying an evolutionary understanding of interpretation of human rights treaties
to find the right to communal ownership present in the right to property).
183. VillagrAn Morales v. Guatemala ("Street Children" Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63,
para. 5 (i99) (Canqado Trindade, J. and Abreu-Burelli, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
184. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the
Due Process of Law, Ad. Op. OC-i6/9 9 , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 114 (1999).
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evolutionary interpretation. Future petitioners and the Commission must
be attentive to this guidance by the Court. New lines of precedent must
be the logical culmination of trends in international human rights law,
rather than innovative (and sparsely supported) constructions. Below, we
set forth five such trends.
a. Non-Discrimination
As illustrated in Part III above, the non-discrimination principle has
been a valuable basis for extending economic, social, and cultural rights,
particularly in circumstances in which these rights would otherwise not
be the basis of any protection. The advantage of using the nondiscrimination principle is that petitioners, the Commission, and the
Court may rely on a fundamentally civil right to expand protection of
economic, social, and cultural rights. In order to make effective use of
this principle, petitioners must seek out situations that allow for
expanding constructions of the idea of discrimination. As we set out in
the proposed cases, allegations of differential resource allocation to
communities with disparate impact on different ethnic groups, for
example, may be an important means of forcing change in governmental
policies concerning a wide range of economic, social, and cultural rights.
In these cases, as in others suggested below, this litigation should be
undertaken jointly with social movements to ensure coordination of
strategies and maximum practical impact.
b. Hybrid Cases
A second guiding principle in the extension of economic, social, and
cultural rights, is what we would term the "hybrid case" approach. By
this, we refer to cases in which the violations denounced by petitioners
and treated by the Inter-American system include abuses of both civil
and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights. In other words,
those cases in which the situation denounced contains intertwined
elements of both classes of rights provide greater possibilities for
successful implementation. The advantage here is that the existence of
violations of civil and political rights guarantee that a case will be
considered admissible by the system. This admissibility will allow the
system to apply the other interpretative principles outlined herein. At
the same time, even if the Commission and Court are unable to
adjudicate the economic, social, and cultural rights allegedly violated due
to mandate limitations, their examination of the case may well provide
the pressure necessary for the entire matter-civil and political as well as
economic,
social, and cultural rights-to be placed on the agenda of the
5
state.'8
185. For example, international pressure (through the use of the Inter-American system, among
other techniques) applied in the 1996 El Dorado dos CarajAs massacre of nineteen landless peasants
by Brazilian police forced authorities to address not only issues related to police impunity and rural
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c.

Economic, Social,and CulturalInterpretationsof Civil and
PoliticalRights- The Elements Approach
Within this concept of hybrid rights, special attention must be paid
to the economic, social, and cultural elements of civil and political rights.
In this way, cases that present -facts amounting to the abuse of particular
economic, social, or cultural elements of a particular civil or political
right will allow the Court to consider these elements without the need for
an express finding with respect to economic, social, or cultural rights.
This idea may also be expressed in terms of the harmful incidence of
violations of economic, social, or cultural rights on one or more civil or
political rights. In this way, economic, social, and -cultural "elements"
may be addressed, either as the underlying factors giving rise to
violations of civil or political rights, or as elements inherent in civil and
political rights that have been violated.
In the Inter-American context, the "elements" approach has
resulted in expansive construction of the right to property I86 and the right
to life.' 8 An example of this type of interpretation is found in the analysis
of the right to life in Judge Canqado Trindade's concurring opinion in
Villagrdn Morales. 8 There, Canqado Trindade analyzed the right to life
as including a much broader set of guarantees than those envisioned by a
strictly civil rights interpretation. His vision includes elements of
economic, social, and cultural rights and is not limited to the classic,
restrictive vision that contemplates the guarantee of life only within civil
rights parameters.
Similar reasoning may be applied to other traditionally civil and
political rights to include in their scope elements of economic, social, and
cultural rights. Thus, for example, an expansive interpretation of the
right to physical integrity, a civil right,, could include the right to medical
treatment, an economic, social, and cultural right. An expansive view of
the right to political participation might include the right to be literate,
and thus the right to be educated. This approach is considered in greater
depth in the proposed hypothetical cases.
d. Specification of Situations of Abuse and of Victims
By this fourth guideline, we refer to the preference for clearly
specified violations and clearly identified victims, rather than amorphous
violence, but also the underlying economic, social, and cultural rights violations, including the need for
greater land reform and credit for landless squatters and farmers. See El Dorado dos Carajis, Petition
11.820, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 4/03, OEA~ser. L./V./II.s8, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003).
186. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79 (2oo); Baena Ricardo (270 Workers v. Panama) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72 (2001);
"Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (2003).
187. See, e.g., Villagrin-Morales v. Guatemala ("Street Children" Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 63 (i999) (Cancado Trindade, J. and Abreu-Burelli, J., concurring).
188. Id.
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violations and undefined classes. In other words, a petition denouncing
the violation of the right to education of a particular community (for
instance, an indigenous community or a group of settled landless
laborers) will have a greater chance of implementation than a decision
finding a general violation of the right to education affecting all children
in a particular nation or political subdivision. While one may prefer the
more general ruling, given that it implies the possibility to alter state
policy at a broader level, in practice, we may anticipate that such a ruling
might not be applied at all by the state affected. On the other hand, a
more limited decision that could be implemented by the state affected,
would establish the same precedent, and would create international legal
bases for the efforts of local rights groups and progressive movements to
implement the principles included in the given sentence on a wider basis.
The decision, of course, would also serve as precedent for legal activists
in other American States.
Commentators Abramovich and Courtis have emphasized the need
to focus on particular victims rather than on generic violations in
domestic cases, and their analysis is instructive here:
[I]n many cases, the State's failure to comply can be reformulated in
terms of concrete and individualized violations rather than generically.
The generic violation of right to health can be recast or reformulated
by the articulation of a particular action, led by an identifiable
individual, that gives rise to a violation, such as the non-provision of a
vaccine or refusal to provide medical services necessary for the
individual's life or health.""
Petitioners seeking to employ this principle must be careful to
debate thoroughly and to consider fully the choice of victims and
communities in bringing cases before the Inter-American system. Too
often, rights groups choose to represent victims and groups affected
based on convenience-either in locating the person or persons affected,
amassing evidence, or working with counsel. While these criteria may be
important, potential petitioners must ask themselves whether the
victim(s) selected are representative of the broader class, whether they
are tied to social movements capable of exerting pressure on
governmental authorities, and whether the media are likely to find the
selected petitioner an attractive one for advocacy.

189. Abramovich & Courtis, supra note 114, at 301 (authors' translation). The original Spanish text

reads:
en muchos casos el incumplimento del Estado puede reformularse en tdrminos de violaci6n
individualizada y concreta, en lugar de forma genfrica. La violaci6n general al derecho a la
salud puede reconducirse o reformularse a travds de la articulaci6n de una acci6n particular,
encabezada en un titular individual, que alegue una violaci6n producida o lano producci6n
de una vacuna, o por lanegaci6n de un servicio medico del que dependa lavida o salud de
esa persona ....
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e. Focus on Rights with UnquestionedAccess
Here, we refer to the preference for denunciation and adjudication
of violations of rights that clearly provide access to the individual
petition system. To date, by means of the San Salvador Protocol,
petitioners may denounce violations of Article 8(a), concerning
associational labor rights, and Article 13, which protects the right to
education. We can expect less resistance from states to decisions
upholding these rights than to determinations extending existing
jurisprudence to other economic, social, and cultural rights.
Cases focusing on these rights, denounced and analyzed within the
limits of these Articles, will have the greatest chance of implementation
by states parties against whom decisions are issued by the Commission or
the Court.
C.

PROPOSED HYPOTHETICAL.CASES

Before setting out proposed cases designed to maximize the efficient
use of the Inter-American system, it will be helpful to emphasize a few of
the principles that should orient a strategic litigation approach. First, we
must recall that the Inter-American system is one of limited access and
limited resources. As such, petitioners should not look to the system as
an arbiter of disputes but rather as a mechanism for producing
jurisprudence with potentially sweeping policy implications. In this
regard, petitioners must focus on the potential impact that the litigation
of cases may have beyond the parties involved.
Second, one must understand the structural limits of the system and
the political forces (e.g., reactionary states) that would gladly seize on
poorly structured precedent as a basis for non-implementation of the
system's rulings, as well as to undermine the already limited resources
and political support afforded the Commission and the Court.
Third, petitioners must be clear about their objectives. This Article
proposes a concrete litigation strategy designed to foster respect for
economic, social, and cultural rights. To this end, it may be necessary in
some cases to emphasize civil and political rights and to seek expansive
interpretations of these rights, rather than to force the Commission and
Court to recognize economic, social, or cultural rights as such, without
sufficient basis in law. In other words, it may be more efficient for the
system to recognize the right to medicine or treatment in a particular
matter as an element of the right to life or the right to physical integrity
than to force the system to recognize, through the individual petitions
process, economic, social, and cultural rights not deemed ripe for
international litigation by states. In short, petitioners should be more
interested in advancing guaranteesfor victims than in advancing rights on
paper. This Article contends that a strategy that focuses on expansive
interpretation of civil and political rights provides greater impetus for the
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advance of economic, social, and cultural rights within the national legal
systems of the Americas by providing guidance for expansive
interpretations of civil and political rights, uniformly guaranteed by the
constitutions of American States.
Finally, petitioners must understand and respect the subsidiary role
of supranational litigation in broader efforts to achieve distributive
justice. This understanding and respect requires that potential litigants
confer with and accept the decisions of social movements and other
actors regarding what issues to address internationally, which victims to
represent, and so forth. Potential litigants at the international level must
be careful not to set the agenda on their own, based exclusively on legal
criteria. Experience demonstrates that international litigation not
accompanied by parallel, coordinated campaigns by social movements
and/or the media is unlikely to produce effective results. In light of this,
we underscore the need for supranational litigators to avoid taking the
lead on strategic decision-making regarding the use of the InterAmerican system.'"
Below, we set out strategies based on several hypothetical and real
cases that litigants in the Inter-American system may employ to advance
respect for economic, social, and cultural rights. We begin with those
rights guaranteed by the San Salvador Protocol and then proceed to
those for which direct access has not been explicitly recognized by the
treaties of the system. With this second group, our focus is on the
protection of elements with economic, social, and cultural implications,
rather than on formal acceptance of the rights themselves.
i. The Right to Education
Given the recent entry into force of the San Salvador Protocol,
petitions alleging violations of the right to education now enjoy a solid
basis for acceptance by the Inter-American system. Article 13 of the San
Salvador Protocol sets out the right to education in some detail. Article
i9(6) assures access to the Inter-American system in the case of
violations of the right to education.'

i9o. Of course, once litigation has begun, strategic decisions regarding litigation should involve
counsel. But even at these stages, legal concerns should not be the only factors employed in designing
advocacy plans.
191. Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 7, art. 19(6). Article 13 of the Right to Education
includes a series of guarantees, with differing levels of immediacy in their application:
Article 13 -Right to Education
3. The States Parties to this Protocol recognize that in order to achieve the full exercise of
the right to education:
a. Primary education should be compulsory and accessible to all without cost;
b. Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary
education, should be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate
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We may imagine a clear-cut case of abuse of Article 13 in which an
individual child or group of children is denied access to free public
education due to any of a series of factors that may range from the
absence of a school within a reasonable distance from a given community
to excessively high fees for registration or the purchase of mandatory
texts. No doubt, it is important that these cases be brought to the
attention of the Commission to enable it to make clear pronouncements
about the nature of the state's obligation to provide free, basic education
to all citizens. Beyond this, however, it will be important to develop cases
that allow the Commission and Court to speak to the contours of this
right. Thus, cases that focus on particular elements of free education
(such as required purchase of uniforms or textbooks, failure to provide
free meals to students, etc.) will permit the system to establish useful
precedents on the range of the rights guaranteed in Article 13.
On a second level, one may imagine a situation in which resources
are distributed to public school districts or to individual schools on a very
unequal basis. One may further imagine that these inequalities
correspond to divisions between and among neighborhoods which, in
turn, manifest different socio-economic and ethnic characteristics. For
example, it will not be difficult for us to imagine two or more schools or
school districts in neighborhoods of different social classes somewhere in
the Americas (preferably in a state that has ratified the San Salvador
Protocol). Further, let us imagine that in the poorer neighborhood, the
resource allocation per student is significantly lower than in a middle or
upper class neighborhood in the same city. We may also imagine that the
two neighborhoods have very different racial compositions. In the poorer
neighborhood, we may imagine a greater percentage of persons of
African and/or indigenous descent, while in the wealthier neighborhood,
residents would be lighter-skinned.
On this set of facts, petitioners may present a powerful case of
violation of the principle of non-discrimination in combination with the
right to education. Were the Commission and Court presented with such
a case, they would be on firm ground were they to find a violation in the
unequal distribution of resources. to the two communities. Further, as a
remedy, the system could order that the state afford roughly equal
resources to the communities. The state would be required to distribute
means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of free education;
c. Higher education should be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of individual
capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of
free education;
d. Basic education should be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons
who have not received or completed the whole cycle of primary instruction;
e. Programs of special education should be established for the handicapped, so as to provide
special instruction and training to persons with physical disabilities or mental deficiencies.
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educational resources on a more equal basis.
Or suppose that in a given country, the state maintains systems of
free elementary and university education. Suppose further that the level
of expenditure per student in the university system exceeds (by a factor
of ten to twenty) the expenditure per student in the elementary school
system. We may imagine that the composition of the student body in
public schools at the elementary school level is very different from the
composition at the university level. At the former level, the student
population reflects the racial diversity of the country. At the latter level,
the student population reflects the highest social classes (and we may
reasonably suppose that this population is disproportionately lighter
skinned and largely excludes persons of African and indigenous descent).
Let us assume that the state with these differences at the elementary
school and university level does not maintain effective affirmative action
programs to guarantee access to superior education to persons from
historically disadvantaged groups.
On these facts, a petition alleging violation of the right to education
in conjunction with the principle of non-discrimination would enable the
system to reach conclusions with potentially revolutionary policy
implications. To make the case stronger, one may imagine a petition that
juxtaposes two communities in the same geographic area. In the first, a
poor community, composed primarily of persons of African or
indigenous descent, some number of children do not have access to
elementary school education. At the same time, in an adjacent or nearby
upper-middle class community composed largely of lighter-skinned
persons, a disproportionate number of residents attend free public
university.
On these facts, a petition alleging violation of the non-discrimination
principle in conjunction with the right to education would provide the
Inter-American system an opportunity to evaluate -through
the
individual case mechanism-the educational policies of a given state.'92 A
word of caution is warranted here. These hypothetical facts-which no
doubt exist in Brazil and elsewhere in the Americas- involve highly
volatile issues in which privileged classes may react to perceived attacks
on their children's access to free university education. Before
undertaking an international litigation strategy that targets the status
192. One case pending before the Inter-American system that addresses the issue of discriminatory
treatment in access to education is Dilcia Yean and Violeta Boscia v. Dominican Republic, Case I2.i89,

Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/01, OEA/ser. L./V./II.rix, doc. 20 rev. (2ooo). In that matter,
petitioners argue that the discriminatory refusal to issue birth certificates to two girls born in the
Dominican Republic to Haitian mothers led to their inability to enroll in school and thus violation of
their right to education. The Yean and Boscia case, though likely to force consideration of the

Dominican Republic's discriminatory treatment of Haitian-Dominicans, may not result in judicial
pronouncement on inequity in Dominican education more generally.
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quo, petitioners must carefully diagnose the potential cases and consult
social movements with which they may partner. Litigating these types of
cases without ensuring sufficiently organized support networks and
supportive media may lead to disastrous results.
2.
The Right to Food
Let us imagine an individual, or group of individuals, who receive
less than an adequate share of calories, protein, carbohydrates, or other
essential nutrients on a regular basis. Let us further assume that this
group of persons informs the relevant authorities of its circumstances and
that these authorities fail to take measures either to respect or to ensure
this right. Let us further assume that the authorities have the resources
necessary to provide for the nutritional needs of the group in question.
As a direct consequence of this failure, one or more individual members
of this group die and/or suffer from otherwise preventable diseases. We
may also assume that one or more members of this group fail to develop
as they would have had they received the adequate nutritional intake
that fate, and official failure has denied them.
We may view this situation as a violation of the right to food.
However, given that the right to food does not provide the basis for an
individual petition to the Inter-American system, regardless of whether
domestic remedies have been exhausted, we would be unable to help
these victims. On the other hand, we may just as easily characterize the
situation as a violation of the right to life, in the case of the member or
members of the group who have died due to inadequate nutrition, or as a
violation of the right to physical integrity, in the case of those who have
suffered from otherwise curable diseases. Again, as in the previous
hypothetical cases, petitioners should ensure the involvement of social
movements and supportive media prior to embarking on the
international litigation strategy.
3. The Right to Health
In the case of Odir Miranda,"3 the issue of the right to health has
been placed squarely before the Commission. In that matter, the
petitioners have argued that the state's failure to provide adequate
medication for persons suffering from HIV and AIDS constitutes a
violation of the right to health. The petitioners have argued that the right
to health is guaranteed, through Article 26, in international treaties
ratified by El Salvador. They have also placed before the Commission
the issue of violation of the right to life. As we have argued above, this
latter line of argument finds more solid support in existing international
precedent both within and without the Inter-American system.

193. Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez v. El Salvador, Case 12.249, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
OEA/ser. L/V/II. i ii, doc. 20 rev. (2000).

29/01,
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We may imagine other instances in which a broad interpretation of
the right to life (or the right to physical integrity) may include elements
of protection, guarantee, or provision of health services, and thus where
the failure to protect, guarantee, or provide such services, constitutes a
violation of the right to life. We may imagine, for example, an instance in
which an individual or group of children does not have access to
vaccines. Let us further imagine that the failure to provide these vaccines
is not the result of lack of resources on the part of the state and that one
or more of the children who do not receive necessary vaccines suffer
from preventable illness leading to death. As in the hypothetical case
regarding the right to nutrition, we may argue that the failure to provide
health services (in this case, vaccines) is the direct cause of serious illness
and death, and thus constitutes a violation of the rights to physical
integrity and health. Selecting a child or children as the petitioner in
advocating the right to well-being (either to physical integrity or, if
applicable, to life) would be a wise strategy from both legal and advocacy
perspectives. In legal terms, international human rights law provides
special protection and guarantees for children, thus enhancing the
chances of a victory on the merits. From a broader advocacy perspective,
the focus on children generates a broad range of allies both within
organized social groups and in the mass media.'94

4.

Right to Housing: Focus on CorrectingInjustice in Housing
Policy
We may imagine as potential petitioners a group of poor urban
dwellers in makeshift houses established in the less desirable areas of a
Latin American city. These residents may establish homes in hillside
communities, on steep inclines without adequate structural support. It is
likely that many of these shelters will not support the heavy rains that
afflict subtropical environments. Indeed, a number of such houses are
washed away every year, in torrential summer showers, leaving many
dead and injured. Let us imagine that these residents have petitioned
local authorities for assistance to build adequate structural support for
their homes or, in the alternative, housing or income subsidies to rent or
buy adequate shelter elsewhere. Let us further assume that these pleas
have failed to provoke the requested response from authorities and, also,
that the authorities' failure is not the result of lack of resources.
194. One issue that has mobilized significant constituencies in Latin America, particularly in
Brazil, has been HIV/AIDS. See Jane Galvao, "Community Mobilization and Access to HIV/AIDS
Medicines: The Brazilian Experience," paper presented at Harvard Medical School (Nov. 3, 2003)
(attributing relative success of efforts to expand access to HIV medication to social movement's
organization and strategic partnership with government authorities). Regardless of the focus of the
case used to advance the Court's jurisprudence and state practice on health care, it is essential that a
local constituency capable of mobilizing authorities exist and that litigants coordinate efforts with
social movements and forces.
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The picture that we have described no doubt constitutes a failure to
ensure the right to housing. But it may also constitute a violation of the
right to life or the right to physical integrity of persons killed or injured
in predictably violent rains. Advocates may argue these claims in this
context.
An alternative approach to advancing the right to housing by
denouncing injustices in housing policy is through application of the nondiscrimination principle. Let us imagine a state that maintains, at a
limited or more comprehensive level, public housing programs. These
programs may range from regulation of the housing market, to tax
subsidies for housing development, to direct provision of housing
through construction programs of shelter for persons of limited means.
We may imagine a number of situations in which this regulation,
guarantee, or provision of housing is tainted by some degree of
discrimination. In a particularly clear case, we may imagine a public
housing program in which construction of houses is tied to political
affiliation in a particularly obvious and vulgar fashion."'
On these facts, we may imagine an individual or group of individuals
that has sought and has been denied access to a particular housing
program based on its lack-of affiliation with the relevant (ruling) party of
a political coalition. Here, a petitioner denied access to participation, in
other words, a petitioner denied the right to housing, ordinarily would
not be able to petition directly to the Inter-American system given that
the right to housing is not a right for which the right to petition is
recognized either in the American Convention or the San Salvador Pact.
However, following the precedent of the European system, set out in the
Abdulaziz,' 9 and Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland'97 cases, and the case
law of the universal system in Zwaan de Vries v. the Netherlands,'98 the
Inter-American system could determine that the failure to provide
housing rights on a discriminatory basis constitutes a violation of the
American Convention even though immediate accessfor violation of these
rights is not afforded by the norms of the system.
CONCLUSION

Supranational litigation has been, and will continue to be, an

195. It would be difficult to imagine a situation in which there were absolutely no political element
in the choice of which communities would benefit from state investment in low-cost or free housing;
thus, we emphasize in this hypothetical case, the existence of an evident link between political
affiliation and participation in a given housing program.
196. Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
197. Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 263 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (993).
198. Zwaan de Vries v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 182/1984 (Human Rights
Committee), para. 12.4, available at http://wwwi.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session42/182-i984.htm
(last accessed Dec. 1, 2004).
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important tool in the efforts to promote respect for economic, social, and
cultural rights in the Americas. But it is merely one tool among many
available to social activists. If employed unwisely- indiscriminately,
excessively, or without due consideration for non-legal factors that
influence economic, social, and cultural rights-it carries the potential to
produce more harm than good. We have sought to demonstrate the
circumstances that have come together to create a context that requires
advocates of economic, social, and cultural rights in the Americas to
exercise caution and restraint to be effective. These circumstances
include severe limits on access to the Inter-American system, the fragile
nature of supranational bodies, and the potential for non-compliance by
states.
Critiques developed in the realm of social justice in the United
States, as well as recent analysis of the proposed individual case
mechanism of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
have raised concerns about the potential for rights-based litigation to
result in counterproductive "queue jumping." We do not subscribe fully
to these views; instead, we argue that litigation has a role to play,
provided practitioners engage international oversight mechanisms as part
of broader strategies that also involve social movements, the media and
other forms of pressure.
Litigation as part of such broader campaigns may advance economic,
social, and cultural rights even without litigating them directly. Within
these constraints, international litigation may be effective. We maintain
that when supranational litigation takes on economic, social, and cultural
rights directly, it should be firmly grounded in solid precedent and
doctrine, effectively eliminating the possibility of state challenge to its
legitimacy.
Finally, we have attempted to chart a course that reflects a pragmatic
approach, in which litigation is closely tied to vigorous social movements
and non-legal campaigns, providing examples of possible cases to be
litigated and lines of argument. Our hope in presenting this approach to
supranational economic, social, and cultural litigation is not to
discourage human rights practitioners from using the Inter-American
system as a means of promoting social justice, but rather to encourage
them to do so in a thoughtful and responsible fashion. In this way, we
suggest, they will enhance their chances of success in their legal battles
and also increase the likelihood of effecting real-world change, while
maintaining the credibility of supranational oversight mechanisms
themselves.
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